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PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND THE
“INTERWEBS”
Alan M. Trammell & Derek E. Bambauer †
For nearly twenty years, lower courts and scholars have struggled to
figure out how personal jurisdiction doctrine should apply in the Internet
age.  When does virtual conduct make someone amenable to jurisdiction in
any particular forum?  The classic but largely discredited response by courts
has been to give primary consideration to a commercial Web site’s interactiv-
ity.  That approach distorts the current doctrine and is divorced from coher-
ent jurisdictional principles.  Moreover, scholars have not yielded satisfying
answers.  They typically have argued either that the Internet is thoroughly
exceptional and requires its own rules, or that it is largely unexceptional and
can be subject to current doctrinal tests.
The difficult relationship between the Internet and modern personal ju-
risdiction doctrine is a symptom of a much larger problem.  We argue that the
Supreme Court’s current approach has bifurcated physical and intangible
harm.  Viewed through that lens, the overarching problem comes into focus
because rules that sensibly govern the physical world apply awkwardly—
sometimes incoherently—to intangible harm.  Accordingly, we propose a re-
turn to personal jurisdiction’s first principles, particularly a concern for fair-
ness and predictability.  We argue that courts should dispense with the
fiction that purely virtual conduct creates any meaningful contact with a
particular forum.  The narrow approach that we advocate likely will restrict
the number of places where a plaintiff can sue for intangible harm, but
through three test cases we demonstrate why such a rule will enhance fairness
and predictability while also ensuring sufficient access to justice.
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INTRODUCTION1
After more than twenty years of silence, the Supreme Court has
recently reentered the fray of personal jurisdiction.  It has been re-
markably active over the last four years, having decided four cases in
that span.2  But the Court has remained conspicuously silent about
one of the most vexing and urgent questions in this area: when (if
ever) virtual conduct, often through the Internet, can justify the exer-
cise of judicial power.
Most courts are still flummoxed by these questions.  They remain
tethered to anachronistic approaches that reflect a profound confu-
sion about the technology of the medium, deviate from normal civil
procedure precedent, bear little relation to the doctrine’s underlying
principles, and fail to generate consistent results.  Current approaches
remain stuck in the days of the “Interwebs” and betray the same lack
of sophistication that the tongue-in-cheek malapropism captures.
1 For those unfamiliar with Internet memes, the “Interwebs” is a sarcastic term to
parody the inexperience of someone who is unfamiliar with the Internet’s customs,
technology, or capabilities. See interweb, URBAN DICTIONARY (Dec. 12, 2003), http://
www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=interweb.
2 See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746
(2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011); J. McIn-
tyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
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Personal jurisdiction is an elusive concept.  Formally, it is rooted
in limits on sovereign power and in protections for defendants against
the arbitrary assertion of governmental force.  While the basis for the
doctrine has evolved over time, the theory worked well enough in a
world of physicality—where defendants could be found within a fo-
rum state, or where their actions had tangible consequences within
those borders.  However, once personal jurisdiction had to grapple
with intangible interests and harms, the doctrine began to go off the
rails, and once it had to contend with the borderless information envi-
ronment of the Internet, it became almost completely unhinged.3
This Article seeks to return personal jurisdiction to first principles.  It
identifies the doctrine’s core concerns and applies them to the
problems of a ubiquitous networked environment.  Its arguments will
not please everyone.  But it offers a consistent and defensible vision of
jurisdiction in the context of costless information sharing, and it
realigns offline and online jurisdiction in a manner that is theoreti-
cally consistent.  Courts must stop allowing themselves to be bedazzled
and bewitched by the “Interwebs.”  Like Dorothy in The Wonderful Wiz-
ard of Oz, they have always had the power to do so—they need only
realize that they never lost it to begin with.4
Since at least the mid-1990s, courts have been aware of the co-
nundrum that the Internet poses to personal jurisdiction analysis.
The modern doctrine often turns on the defendant’s “contacts”5 with
a particular state and the extent to which those contacts reflect “pur-
poseful” action.6 In a concurrence in one of the recent Supreme
Court cases, Justice Breyer aptly elucidated many of the questions that
courts and scholars have confronted over the years.  What does it
“mean when a company targets the world by selling products from its
Web site?  And does it matter if, instead of shipping the products di-
rectly, a company consigns the products through an intermediary
(say, Amazon.com) who then receives and fulfills the orders?”7  More-
over, should it matter whether the defendant is a small mom-and-pop
operation—in Justice Breyer’s example, an Appalachian potter who
3 See Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the
Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 350 n.241
(2013) (stating that after Nicastro, “[a]lso left in disarray are personal jurisdiction questions
relating to claims arising from a defendant’s activities on the Internet”).  As we discuss, the
Internet is only the latest manifestation of a problem that has long existed in law. See Felix
S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809,
809–12 (1935).
4 See L. FRANK BAUM, THE WONDERFUL WIZARD OF OZ 131 (1983).
5 See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 319 (1945).
6 See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297–98 (1980).
7 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2793 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
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sells cups and saucers—or a large multinational corporation?8  One
can easily add to the litany of questions: How should courts deal with
alleged defamation on the Internet?  If a Web site infringes a pro-
tected trademark, where exactly has the harm occurred?
In 1997, one district court proposed a way to mold the traditional
tests to the new medium.  It suggested that a Web site’s commercial
nature and degree of interactivity essentially can measure contacts
and purposefulness.9  A passive Web site would not be enough to jus-
tify jurisdiction.  Actually concluding sales on the Internet would be.
And between those two extremes, as a Web site evinced greater inter-
activity, and thus a greater exchange of commercial information with
consumers, courts should be increasingly likely to find that Internet
activity justifies jurisdiction.10  The Zippo sliding scale seemed beauti-
fully simple and has proved singularly influential.  Most courts to con-
front the problem of Internet-based jurisdiction have relied favorably
on Zippo, even though the test’s supposed virtues are chimerical.  It
distorts the doctrine and its guiding principles.  It is predicated on a
superficial analogy between physical and virtual worlds.  And it has
proved conspicuously indeterminate.  Yet it endures.
Legal scholars who study Internet law have struggled with these
questions of jurisdiction from the earliest days of the field.11  Views of
jurisdiction over a defendant by a sovereign state, and of that state’s
enforcement powers, passed through three eras.  In the first, scholars
believed (either optimistically or naively) that conventional
nation-states had no capability to govern online behavior.12  So-called
Netizens might join together to create new governance structures,13
but states, those “weary giants of flesh and steel,”14 were supposedly
impotent in the face of this new communications technology.  But In-
ternet censorship in countries such as China and Saudi Arabia quickly
demonstrated the fallibility of this view.15
8 See id.
9 See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
10 See id.
11 See, e.g., Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1, 13–25
(1996) (discussing applications of traditional personal jurisdiction principles to
cyberspace).
12 See, e.g., Viktor Mayer-Scho¨nberger & Teree E. Foster, A Regulatory Web: Free Speech
and the Global Information Infrastructure, 3 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 45, 55–61
(1997); David G. Post, Anarchy, State, and the Internet: An Essay on Law-Making in Cyberspace,
1995 J. ONLINE L. 44, 57–59; Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountabil-
ity: Challenges to the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1665–70 (1995).
13 See Branscomb, supra note 12, at 1665–70. R
14 John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (Feb. 8, 1996),
https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html.
15 See ETHAN GUTMANN, LOSING THE NEW CHINA: A STORY OF AMERICAN COMMERCE,
DESIRE AND BETRAYAL 127–34 (2004); Jonathan Zittrain & Benjamin Edelman,
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In the second era, legal academics conceded the state’s enforce-
ment powers but argued that, as a normative matter, terrestrial gov-
ernments should withdraw from the field and allow Internet-specific
governance to emerge.16  Those governments rapidly proved unwill-
ing to declare cyberspace a zone of order (or disorder) without law.
Finally, the third era recontextualized the Internet as simply an-
other communications medium, where oversight by law could operate
legitimately while taking account of the Net’s idiosyncrasies.17  Juris-
diction by states, under the right circumstances, was not only possible,
but desirable.18  The progression through these three periods high-
lights a key issue: whether states should engage in or refrain from ad-
judication of disputes deriving from online interaction.
Despite intense scholarly interest in this problem at the turn of
the century, it remains intractable.  Even the best contributions are
dated or narrow, or they give insufficient attention to at least one as-
pect of the problem (that is, either the technology or the procedural
nuances).  In this Article, we draw on our respective expertise to offer
a solution that is both technologically sophisticated and also attentive
to the interstices of civil procedure.  Our contribution charts a new
course independent of the cyber-exceptionalists and also those who
have argued that courts can readily apply the current doctrine to the
Internet world.  The Internet is not sui generis, but it does present
unique challenges that courts should not gloss over.
Our Article makes three major contributions to this enduringly
unsettled area of law.  First, our central argument is that courts have
tied themselves in knots over Internet-based contacts because they
have failed to appreciate a more significant, overarching dichotomy:
the difference between physical harm and intangible harm.  Most ju-
risdictional rules evolved to take account of the ways in which physical
harm could present itself.  Centuries ago, most harm was localized,
and the rules reflected that reality.  As society became more mobile,
such that a person could cause physical harm far from his home, the
jurisdictional rules adapted to that new reality.  But the various tests
that have developed are still squarely oriented around notions of phys-
ical harm—car accidents, defective products, and the like.19
Documentation of Internet Filtering in Saudi Arabia, BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y
(Sept. 12, 2002), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/saudiarabia/.
16 See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyber-
space, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1387–92 (1996).
17 See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A
BORDERLESS WORLD (2006); Joseph H. Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1145, 1205–07 (2000).
18 See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 17, at 129–45. R
19 See infra subparts I.A–B.
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The current tests begin to unravel—both conceptually and
pragmatically—when the harm at issue is intangible.  For example, in
the defamation context, where does one’s reputation exist?  As courts
tried to apply the rules of a physical world to intangible harms, the
results were awkward—at times, even incoherent—and laid the path
for online follies to come.  Thus, the Internet did not create the prob-
lem.  It did, however, expose and exacerbate a more profound schism
between physical and intangible harm.
Second, we argue for a return to personal jurisdiction’s underly-
ing principles to figure out how best to craft sensible rules for cases
presenting purely intangible harm.  To do so, we articulate a tripartite
view of personal jurisdiction’s deep structure: constitutionally com-
pelled restrictions (imposed by the Due Process Clauses); prudential
common law restrictions (crafted by the Supreme Court); and
state-specific restrictions (embodied in long-arm statutes).  Within
each of these layers are limitations on judicial authority that derive
from different sources and carry different weights.  But they share a
fundamental concern for fairness and predictability.  While personal
jurisdiction precedent often interweaves and even conflates various
normative rationales,20 refocusing the analysis on the overarching
goals of fairness and predictability has the potential to extricate the
doctrine from unnecessary traps.  Moreover, identifying the precise
sources of personal jurisdiction demonstrates the latitude that both
courts and legislatures have to reorient the doctrine in a more norma-
tively satisfying way.
Finally, we set out three test cases for assessing how Internet-
based contacts ought to count in the personal jurisdiction analysis.
We discuss how the doctrine should effectuate the goals of fairness
and predictability, clearly defined, in the context of those test cases.
Specifically, our analysis focuses on private fairness concerns (plain-
tiffs’ and defendants’ ability to plan their conduct and vindicate their
rights effectively) and society’s interest in the efficient use of public
resources.  In so doing, we develop a proposal to realign courts’ ap-
proaches to online and offline cases in a way that better effectuates
personal jurisdiction’s first principles.  Put simply, courts should take
a narrow approach when dealing with intangible harm, whether that
is a traditional harm (such as defamation in print media) or a mod-
ern, virtual harm (such as a Web site that infringes a trademark).
Courts should no longer indulge the fiction that virtual activity creates
physical contact with any particular forum.  Dispensing with that fic-
tion undoubtedly will limit the places where a plaintiff can sue for
20 Other value choices are of course possible. See, e.g., Damon C. Andrews & John M.
Newman, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in the Cloud, 73 MD. L. REV. 313, 352 (2013)
(prioritizing predictability, transparency, and objectivity).
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intangible harm, but it will create a more robust, coherent, and worka-
ble doctrine.
In Part I of the Article, we describe how courts have bifurcated
notions of physical and intangible harm for purposes of personal juris-
diction.  We also demonstrate the confusion and indeterminacy that
have resulted as lower courts attempt to apply existing doctrine in the
Internet age.  In Part II, we return to personal jurisdiction’s first prin-
ciples and discuss the unique problems that cyberspace poses.  In Part
III we articulate and defend a narrow approach to Internet-based
harm and intangible harm more generally.
I
VIOLENCE AND THE WRIT: CABINING SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY
Personal jurisdiction doctrine has evolved dramatically over the
last 150 years.  A doctrine long rooted in strictly territorial notions of
sovereignty eventually gave way to modern realities.  In the early to
mid-twentieth century, the doctrine began—first implicitly then quite
explicitly—to take account of the increased mobility of people and
the proliferation of corporate activities across state and international
boundaries.  In the process, the Supreme Court crystallized the tests
that have characterized the modern doctrine for many decades.
But past is prologue.  Just as courts in the early twentieth century
struggled to adapt doctrine to new realities, so too courts and scholars
have wrestled with how personal jurisdiction can and should function
in an era of virtual conduct and intangible harm.
In this Part, we briefly sketch the doctrine’s contours, which
largely turn on a defendant’s purposeful contacts with a particular
place.  Our goal is not to retell in detail how the doctrine has evolved
since the late nineteenth century; others have more than admirably
undertaken that task.21 Instead, we illustrate how personal jurisdic-
tion, despite its modernization in the twentieth century, is still yoked
to intensely geographic conceptions of behavior, harm, and judicial
power.  The shortcomings of that approach started to become appar-
ent when courts pressed geographic notions of jurisdiction into ser-
vice as they analyzed purely intangible harm.  But the advent of the
commercial Internet demonstrated how truly blinkered and often un-
workable the doctrine has become for a large swath of modern cases.
21 See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction:
From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 56–78 (1990);
William M. Richman, Understanding Personal Jurisdiction, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599, 599–637
(1993); A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
617, 620–25 (2006); Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610,
614–30 (1988); Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1135–63 (1966).
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A. Personal Jurisdiction in a Physical World
Since the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court has em-
braced two distinct theories of personal jurisdiction: general (or
all-purpose) jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction.22  The traditional
theory, general jurisdiction, identifies a place where a defendant can
be sued for anything.23  For example, a New York citizen who travels to
California and causes a car accident there can be sued in his home
state of New York, even though the lawsuit itself has nothing to do
with New York.  By contrast, the modern theory, specific jurisdiction,
authorizes jurisdiction over a defendant when there is a connection
between the lawsuit and the litigation forum.24  Thus, the New Yorker
is also subject to personal jurisdiction in California regarding the car
accident that he caused there.
Today the contours of general jurisdiction are remarkably clear.
After decades in which lower courts applied amorphous and unpre-
dictable standards with widely divergent results,25 the Supreme Court
recently clarified how stringent the test for general jurisdiction is.  For
an individual, it is appropriate only in her state of domicile—her
home.26  In Goodyear and Daimler, the Court articulated a similar test
for corporations, restricting general jurisdiction to a place where a
corporation is “at home.”27  In almost every situation that will mean
two paradigm places: the state where the entity has incorporated and
the state in which it maintains its principal place of business.28
22 See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 21, at 59–60. R
23 See, e.g., id. at 60; Richman, supra note 21, at 614. R
24 See Alan M. Trammell, A Tale of Two Jurisdictions, 68 VAND. L. REV. 501, 507 (2015);
von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 21, at 1144–45. R
25 See James R. Pielemeier, Goodyear Dunlop: A Welcome Refinement of the Language of
General Personal Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 969, 980–84 (2012); Trammell, supra
note 24, at 511–12; Twitchell, supra note 21, at 630–43. R
26 See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853–54 (2011); 13E CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET
AL., FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 3612 (3d ed. 2009).  The Supreme Court has continued to recog-
nize that a state may exercise general jurisdiction over a person who is personally served
with process in that state. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610–16 (1990).
Although this tradition is deeply rooted in English and American practice, many scholars
have argued that it is an anachronism. See, e.g., Terry S. Kogan, Geography and Due Process:
The Social Meaning of Adjudicative Jurisdiction, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 627, 654–57 (1991); Martin H.
Redish, Tradition, Fairness, and Personal Jurisdiction: Due Process and Constitutional Theory After
Burnham v. Superior Court, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 675, 678–81 (1991); Allan R. Stein, The Mean-
ing of “Essentially at Home” in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 S.C. L. REV. 527, 548–49 (2012) (argu-
ing that the Court should “move off of its position that jurisdiction over persons is justified
by raw territorial power”).
27 See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851, 2854, 2857; see also Trammell, supra note 24, at 519
(noting that the majority opinion in Daimler used the “at home” phrase eighteen times).
28 See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 753–60; Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853–57; Trammell, supra
note 25, at 513–21.  The Court left open the possibility that a corporate defendant might R
be subject to jurisdiction elsewhere, but that possibility remains vanishingly small. See, e.g.,
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447–49 (1952) (allowing
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Before Goodyear and Daimler, general jurisdiction presented a co-
nundrum in the Internet context, with some courts subjecting compa-
nies to general jurisdiction based on shockingly low levels of Internet
activity within a state.29  That uncertainty should evaporate in the
wake of Goodyear and Daimler.
The heart of the problem lies with specific jurisdiction.  In the
iconic case of International Shoe, the Supreme Court explicitly intro-
duced the modern theory of personal jurisdiction.30  For decades the
Court wrestled with its precise contours, which have ebbed and
flowed,31 but since the 1980s, the Court has made clear that there are
essentially three elements to specific jurisdiction.
First, the defendant must have “minimum contacts” with the fo-
rum state.32  Since the Court first announced the test, it has empha-
sized that this prong turns not simply on the number of contacts but
also on their “quality and nature.”33  But minimum contacts are just
that—the plaintiff need not choose a forum with which the defendant
has the most or best contacts.34  The touchstone of the analysis is that
the defendants’ contacts must be more than merely fortuitous.35
Rather, the defendant must have purposefully engaged in activity
within, or directed toward, the forum state.36
Second, there has to be a fairly tight nexus between the “mini-
mum contacts” and the lawsuit—in the Court’s usual language, the
general jurisdiction in Ohio, where defendant had temporarily relocated during World
War II); see also Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 756 n.8 (describing Perkins, the one case in which the
Court authorized general jurisdiction somewhere other than one of the paradigm forums,
as presenting “exceptional facts”).
29 See, e.g., Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1076–80 (9th Cir. 2003)
(finding general jurisdiction over L.L. Bean in California because of marketing and sales in
the state, despite L.L. Bean’s having “few of the factors traditionally associated with physi-
cal presence”); see also Allan R. Stein, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Seeing Due Process
Through the Lens of Regulatory Precision, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 411, 436–41 (2004).
30 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 319 (1945).
31 Compare McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (taking expansive
approach to jurisdiction in so-called “single contact” cases), with Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 250–53 (1958) (taking more restrictive approach), and World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295–99 (1980) (same); see also Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2854
(noting the ebb and flow).
32 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291–92; Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316.
33 Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319.
34 See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 (1984) (noting that
plaintiff experienced bulk of harm outside of forum but that defendant nonetheless had
minimum contacts with forum); see also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 228 (1977)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that “we are concerned solely with ‘minimum’ contacts,
not the ‘best’ contacts”).
35 See Keeton, 465 U.S. at 774; see also World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298 (noting
that plaintiff’s unilateral activity cannot create minimum contacts between defendant and
forum); Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253 (same).
36 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475–76 (1985); World-Wide Volk-
swagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
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plaintiff’s claim must “arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s forum
contacts.37  Despite an occasional kerfuffle over exactly what standard
governs this nexus requirement,38 the Supreme Court has never
squarely addressed the matter.39
Third, the exercise of personal jurisdiction must be fundamen-
tally fair and reasonable.40  The doctrine has developed such that this
final prong acts as an independent, albeit very limited, safety valve.41
When a defendant has sufficient (purposeful) minimum contacts with
the forum and the claim has the appropriate nexus with those con-
tacts, jurisdiction might still be problematic.  The Supreme Court has
cited a bevy of factors that are part of the fairness calculus,42 the most
obvious of which is inconvenience (both to defendants and plain-
tiffs).43  Other factors include the forum’s interest in the litigation
and, more inscrutably, “the interstate judicial system’s interest in ob-
taining the most efficient resolution of controversies” as well as “the
shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental sub-
stantive social policies.”44  The Court has also added “the Federal Gov-
ernment’s interest in its foreign relations policies” to the list of
fairness factors.45
The fairness factors have done very little work in the Supreme
Court’s actual decisions.  In nearly every situation, if the defendant
has satisfied the minimum contacts prong, then a court’s exercise of
personal jurisdiction will be fundamentally fair.46  The one exception
is the Asahi case, in which two foreign manufacturers were litigating
an indemnity question in California, even after the original plaintiff, a
37 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472; Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466
U.S. 408, 414 (1984).
38 Compare Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 425 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that “there is
a substantial difference” between the standards that the Court usually articulates—“arise
out of” and “relate to”—and that the choice was dispositive), with id. at 415 n.10 (majority
opinion) (refusing to consider any potential difference).
39 Lower courts have not settled on a single approach. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Sandy
Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 318–20 (3d Cir. 2007) (exploring different levels of connect-
edness between lawsuit and forum necessary for specific jurisdiction).
40 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291–92; see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (originally formulating this prong as requiring that “the mainte-
nance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’”)
(quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
41 World-Wide Volkswagen is largely responsible for clearly differentiating the minimum
contacts and fairness prongs, such that minimum contacts are necessary even if jurisdiction
otherwise would be fundamentally fair to the defendant. See 444 U.S. at 293–94.
42 See Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility, and Minimum Contacts: Toward a Mixed Theory
of Personal Jurisdiction, 108 YALE L.J. 189, 195–99 (1998).
43 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
44 Id.
45 Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987).
46 See Richman, supra note 21, at 633–35. R
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Californian, had settled and was no longer a party.47  Citing Califor-
nia’s lack of any significant interest in the litigation and the exceed-
ingly heavy burden on the defendant to travel there (with no
corresponding convenience to the plaintiff), the Court held that juris-
diction was impermissible based on the fairness prong.48
The better view of the fairness inquiry is that most of the consid-
erations that the Supreme Court has identified are prudential re-
straints on a court’s power to hale defendants into court.  There
remains, however, a narrow but important constitutional part of the
fairness inquiry.  In World-Wide Volkswagen, Justice Brennan empha-
sized that any unreasonableness, unfairness, or burden categorically
prohibits jurisdiction only when that burden is of a constitutional di-
mension.  Thus, merely having to travel to the plaintiff’s chosen fo-
rum is not constitutionally significant.49  Instead, a burden becomes
problematic only when it prevents a defendant from putting on his
case—for example, because the witnesses or other evidence cannot be
presented in the forum.50  Although Justice Brennan’s opinion was
largely a dissent regarding a different matter,51 his view of the fairness
prong is consistent with what the majority says about fairness.52  The
Brennan dissent, though, gives content to the fairness inquiry more
concretely and coherently than any other Supreme Court opinion.
Moreover, it demonstrates how little work the notion of (constitu-
tional) unfairness currently does in the personal jurisdiction context.
As the Supreme Court has crafted the contours of personal juris-
diction over the last seventy years, the doctrine has remained tethered
to physical interests and harms.  For the lion’s share of cases, the as-
sumption that physicality can effectuate personal jurisdiction’s goals
was probably well founded.  But the occasional case exposed that ap-
proach’s latent flaws.
B. Personal Jurisdiction and Intangible Harm
Despite this Article’s focus on the Internet, personal jurisdiction
doctrine began to unravel nearly a decade before the first graphical
web browser appeared in 1993 in a case treating a far older communi-
cations medium: the newspaper.  Intangible harms strained personal
jurisdiction nearly to the conceptual breaking point.
47 See Asahi, 480 U.S.  at 106; Richman, supra note 21, at 635. R
48 See Asahi, 480 U.S.  at 115–16.
49 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 301 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
50 See id.
51 Namely, whether the first prong’s minimum contacts requirement is an indepen-
dent inquiry. See id. at 299–300.
52 See id. at 292 (majority view), 300–01 (Brennan’s view).
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In 1979, the National Enquirer—then a checkout-stand gossip
rag—published an article claiming that Shirley Jones, who played
wholesome mother Shirley Partridge on the hit television series The
Partridge Family, was a drunk trapped in an emotionally abusive mar-
riage.53  Jones sued for defamation in California; the Enquirer was
based in Florida.54  The paper itself could undoubtedly be sued in the
Golden State—it sold 600,000 copies a year (roughly eleven percent
of its total circulation) there.55  The question was whether the author
and editor of the story, who had no other relevant contacts with Cali-
fornia, were subject to jurisdiction.56  The Supreme Court held that
they were: Jones’s reputation was based in California (since her pro-
fessional community was there), and so any harm from the allegedly
defamatory story would occur in the state.57  Moreover, both individ-
ual defendants knew Jones was a California resident famous in that
state and thus could predict that harm would occur there.58  The case
launched the famous and much-criticized “effects test” for personal
jurisdiction regarding defamation claims.59
The key to the case—and the reason for the controversy—is that
it required departing from the familiar physical-world framework that
courts had so laboriously worked out for personal jurisdiction.  Jones
resided in California, and a sizeable percentage of the magazines
wound up in California.  But none of that really mattered: the critical
factor was that Jones’s reputation resided there.60  Reputations are in-
tangible and can have multiple homes.  Jones, a Broadway actress as
well as a Hollywood one, doubtless had a reputation capable of injury
in New York as well.61  The problem easily multiplies.  Imagine Jones
spent summers acting in traveling productions in Boston and annually
appeared in a widely-loved version of A Christmas Story in Chicago.
The Enquirer would arguably be subject to suit in Massachusetts and
Illinois as well.  Personal jurisdiction becomes coterminous with the
plaintiff’s reputation, which the defendant may or may not easily
53 See Aljean Harmetz, National Enquirer Agrees to Settle with Shirley Jones in Libel Suit, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 27, 1984), http://www.nytimes.com/1984/04/27/us/national-enquirer-agrees
-to-settle-with-shirley-jones-in-libel-suit.html.
54 See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 784–86 (1984).
55 See id. at 785.
56 See id. at 788–89.
57 See id.
58 See id. at 789–90.
59 See, e.g., Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Inextricable Merits Problem in Personal Juris-
diction, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1301, 1310 (2012) (noting that “decisions applying the effects
test are often conflicting and contradictory, and efforts to smooth the inconsistent doc-
trine have been largely ineffective”).
60 See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789.
61 See Shirley Jones, MASTERWORKS BROADWAY, http://www.masterworksbroadway.com/
artist/shirley-jones (last visited Apr. 7, 2015) (describing Jones’ successful Broadway
career).
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discover.  And while the printed copies of the Enquirer physically
landed on newsstands in Los Angeles, the harm came not from their
weight or newsprint, but from the information contained therein.62
Thus, the Calder Court faced a situation with three intangible factors:
the scope of the plaintiff’s reputation, the spread of the allegedly de-
famatory information, and the extent of the defendant’s knowledge
about the plaintiff’s reputation.
While the Calder opinion portrays the contest as a choice between
California and Florida, that bifurcation is a convenient fiction that
overlooks important differences between physical and intangible ef-
fects.  The Court pigeonholed the case into a familiar framework of
intentional torts.  For example, if someone aims a gun from a high-
rise in Manhattan at a person just across the Hudson River in New
Jersey, it makes sense that the gunman should be subject to jurisdic-
tion in New Jersey, where he intended to cause physical harm. Calder
treated the National Enquirer and the hypothetical gunman as identical
for jurisdictional purposes.  The National Enquirer story effectively was
a defamation bomb, armed in Florida and detonated in California,
that damaged Jones’s reputation.63
What the Calder Court misses, though, is that bombs are rivalrous
whereas information is not.64  Even a bomb mailed to a random postal
address explodes in only one place.  But with the spread of informa-
tion (even pre-Internet), a more accurate analogy is that the Enquirer
writer and editor armed defamation bombs and sent them to every
state, where they went off.65  The only remaining question was
whether Jones had a reputation in any particular state and thus could
experience injury there.  With real bombs, a defendant generally
knows where they will detonate and can readily predict harm.  With
defamation, the defendant has far less control over the final destina-
tion (newspapers cross state lines with the aid of travelers), and far less
ability to predict harm, since she may be unable to ascertain where the
62 See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789 (stating that “the brunt of the harm, in terms both of
[Jones]’s emotional distress and the injury to her professional reputation, was suffered in
California”).
63 See id. at 788–90.
64 Cf. James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Do-
main, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 41–42 (2003) (discussing nonrivalrousness of infor-
mation goods); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. LEGAL. STUD. 325, 326 (1989) (describing copyright law as one remedy for un-
derproduction because of nonrivalrousness).
65 Cf. Dow Jones & Co. v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575, para. 14 (Austl.) (Gleeson, C.J.),
(adopting such an expansive approach to defamation); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,
465 U.S. 770, 773–74, 781 (1984) (permitting suit in New Hampshire, the one state in
which the statute of limitations on plaintiff’s libel claim had not run, for damages incurred
throughout the United States).
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plaintiff’s reputation runs.66  This is an example of information asym-
metry that can affect fairness: the plaintiff likely has better informa-
tion about the presence of her reputation in a particular forum than
does the defendant.
Put simply, the Calder Court overlooked the most difficult aspect
of the case: all of the relevant factors in the jurisdictional analysis were
intangible and presented the usual problems of intangible goods.67
Yet the decision applied physical precedent without taking account of
those conceptual differences.
Calder has been the subject of pitched criticism,68 but its ap-
proach has spread beyond intentional torts to areas such as trademark
infringement.69  As we discuss in subpart III.C, trademark infringe-
ment presents the same problems as defamation, but in even sharper
form.  Tort doctrine devolves from the common law, allowing courts
to shape its contours.70  By contrast, trademark law at the federal level
is a creature of statute and thus is less amenable to prudential tweak-
ing.71  And while torts nearly always require some level of mens rea,
trademark law is a zone of strict liability.72  Accordingly, the Calder
approach for trademark is even more problematic and unmoored
from personal jurisdiction principles than it is for intentional torts.
Calder set the stage for courts to flub their lines when it came time to
declaim on personal jurisdiction and the Internet.
C. String of Errors
The emergence of widely-available, packet-switched computer
networks carrying commercial traffic—that is, the Internet and partic-
ularly the World Wide Web application—caused considerable confu-
sion for courts.73  This technological shift is of recent vintage, though
66 But cf. Dow Jones para. 39 (holding that “those who make information accessible by
a particular method do so knowing of the reach that their information may have”).
67 See Calder, 465 U.S. at 788–89.
68 For an especially good recent treatment, see Robertson, supra note 59, at 1309–26. R
69 See, e.g., Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d 1280, 1288 (11th Cir. 2008); see also
Allyson W. Haynes, The Short Arm of the Law: Simplifying Personal Jurisdiction Over Virtually
Present Defendants, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 133, 147 n.88 (2009) (discussing tort cases after
Calder applying the effects test).
70 See G. Edward White, The Intellectual Origins of Torts in America, 86 YALE L.J. 671,
678–83 (1977).
71 See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2013).
72 See, e.g., uBID Inc. v. GoDaddy Group, Inc., 623 F.3d 421, 435 (7th Cir. 2010).
73 The Internet is a set of computers communicating via shared protocols, mostly
notably TCP/IP.  The WWW is one of the applications—or, put differently, one of the
types of information—transmitted among those computers. See generally BARBARA VAN
SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVATION 83–90 (2010) (describing core In-
ternet protocols and design).
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it seems like distant history to the current generation of lawyers.74
The National Science Foundation permitted commercial traffic on
the NSFNET backbone beginning in May 1991,75 and the first graphi-
cal Web browser, Mosaic, debuted in the United States in 1993.76  By
the time that the federal government privatized the Internet back-
bone, in 1995, the commercial Net was in full swing.77  Courts sud-
denly faced a host of legal questions driven by a fundamental shift in
communications technology.  Previous precedent on personal juris-
diction covered information transfer by mail,78 long-distance tele-
phone,79 and even computer bulletin board service,80 but the Net
presented a difference in kind rather than degree.  The technology
dramatically decreased the cost of creating and sharing information,
operating over an architecture where physical borders were largely an
afterthought.
Cyber-related opinions from the 1990s are replete with introduc-
tory paragraphs ponderously describing “the Internet.”  Many show
judges groping towards some understanding of the technology
through analogies to more familiar subjects.81  A federal district court
in Arizona provided a typical example:
The Internet can be described by a number of different metaphors,
all fitting for different features and services that it provides.  For
example, the Internet resembles a highway, consisting of many
streets leading to places where a user can find information.  The
metaphor of the Internet as a shopping mall or supermarket, on the
other hand, aptly describes the Internet as a place where the user
can shop for goods, information, and services.  Finally, the Internet
also can be viewed as a telephone system for computers by which
74 See JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST GENERA-
TION OF DIGITAL NATIVES (2008).
75 MILTON L. MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT: INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE TAMING OF
CYBERSPACE 106 (2002).
76 Michael Calore, April 22, 1993: Mosaic Browser Lights Up Web With Color, Creativity,
WIRED (Apr. 22, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2010/04/0422mosaic-web-
browser/.
77 See MUELLER, supra note 75, at 107; Barry M. Leiner et al., Brief History of the Internet, R
INTERNET SOC’Y, http://www.internetsociety.org/internet/what-internet/history-internet/
brief-history-internet.
78 See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222–23 (1957); Reuber v. United
States, 750 F.2d 1039, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
79 See Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., 557 F.2d 1280, 1283–84, 1288 (9th Cir.
1977).
80 See Cal. Software, Inc. v. Reliability Research, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1356, 1361–64
(C.D. Cal. 1986).
81 For a counter-example, see Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296,
1299 (C.D. Cal. 1996), where the court’s description of the Internet is accurate, cogent,
and readable.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-5\CRN503.txt unknown Seq: 16 12-JUN-15 11:15
1144 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:1129
data bases of information can be downloaded to the user, as if all
the information existed in the user’s computer’s disc drive.82
Along with inevitable difficulties in substantive areas, courts strug-
gled to articulate and then apply coherent tests for assessing how on-
line activity should influence personal jurisdiction analysis.83  The
results were not reassuring: nearly identical facts led to contrary con-
clusions in different courts.  For example, a Connecticut district court
held that a technology firm with a Web site and toll-free telephone
number “directed its advertising activities via the Internet and its
toll-free number toward not only the state of Connecticut, but to all
states,” and “purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing busi-
ness within Connecticut.”84  Similarly, a California e-mail advertising
firm found itself subject to jurisdiction in Missouri because it operated
a Web site available to users in the state, which was accessed 311 times
from within Missouri.85  The court noted that the defendant “auto-
matically and indiscriminately responds to each and every internet
user who accesses its website”—that, of course, describing how the ba-
sic technology of Web sites and servers functions.86
By contrast, a nonresident insurance company escaped jurisdic-
tion in Illinois, despite its Web site, toll-free number, and advertising
in national media such as television.87  The district court stated: “It
cannot plausibly be argued that any defendant who advertises nation-
ally could expect to be haled into court in any state, for a cause of
action that does not relate to the advertisements.”88  And the operator
of a jazz club in Missouri could not be subject to jurisdiction in New
82 Edias Software Int’l v. Basis Int’l, 947 F. Supp. 413, 419 (D. Ariz. 1996) (footnotes
omitted).
83 See, e.g., Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 453–58 (2d Cir. 2001)
(struggling with First Amendment protection for hyperlinks); Voyeur Dorm v. City of
Tampa, 265 F.3d 1232, 1235–37 (11th Cir. 2001) (same with application of zoning laws
covering adult entertainment to house streaming such content online); CompuServe v.
Cyber Promotions, 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1020–28 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (same for trespass and
spam e-mail messages); Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 24 Media L. Rep. 1126,
1127–28 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1995) (same with intermediary liability for allegedly defamatory
content).
84 Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996).
85 See Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1330–33 (E.D. Mo. 1996); see also
Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1996) (holding that defendant
was subject to jurisdiction in D.C. because it solicited donations on a home page available
to D.C. residents and in the D.C. local newspaper); M&B Beverage Corp. v. N.Y.N.Y. Hotel,
No. 96-2481-CIV-MORENO, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22926 at *14–19 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 27,
1996) (same for defendant in Florida because it advertised to Florida residents on a web-
site and through promotional material mailings).
86 See Cybergold, 947 F. Supp. at 1333. On HTTP, see R. Fielding et al., Hypertext Trans-
fer Protocol – HTTP/1.1, RFC 2616 (June 1999), https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2616.txt; Cade
Metz, Berners-Lee: World Finally Realizes Web Belongs to No One, WIRED (June 6, 2012), http:/
/www.wired.com/2012/06/sir-tim-berners-lee/.
87 See IDS Life Ins. v. Sunamerica, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1258, 1268 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
88 Id.
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York merely by dint of establishing a Web site, even when the site
linked to the plaintiff’s Web page.89  Depending upon the court, a
defendant’s Web site could create minimum contacts with every state,
or with none.  At least one of those positions had to be wrong.
In early 1997, a potential silver bullet arrived—or, rather, a silver
cigarette lighter.  Zippo Manufacturing Company, which produces the
famous lighters, sued a California firm, Zippo Dot Com, which regis-
tered the domain name zippo.com and used it as a portal to USENET
groups.90  The lighter company sued in its home state of Pennsylvania,
asserting both federal and state trademark infringement claims.91  Its
contacts with Pennsylvania included contracts with Internet service
providers (ISPs) in the state to enable their users to access Zippo Dot
Com content along with access to that content by roughly 3,000 Penn-
sylvania users.92  The California company moved to dismiss the com-
plaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.93
The district court held that Zippo Dot Com could be haled into
court in the western district of Pennsylvania.94  After rehearsing the
familiar standards for analyzing personal jurisdiction, the court
turned to the Internet:
[T]he likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally
exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of com-
mercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet.  This slid-
ing scale is consistent with well developed personal jurisdiction
principles.  At one end of the spectrum are situations where a de-
fendant clearly does business over the Internet.  If the defendant
enters into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that in-
volve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over
the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper.  At the opposite end
are situations where a defendant has simply posted information on
an Internet Web site which is accessible to users in foreign jurisdic-
tions.  A passive Web site that does little more than make informa-
tion available to those who are interested in it is not grounds for the
exercise [of] personal jurisdiction.  The middle ground is occupied
by interactive Web sites where a user can exchange information with
the host computer.  In these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is
determined by examining the level of interactivity and commercial
89 See Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 297–98, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
90 See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1121 (W.D. Pa.
1997).  On USENET, see S. Barber, Common NNTP Extensions, RFC 2980 (Oct. 2000), http:/
/tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2980; Adam Dachis, How to Get Started with Usenet in Three Simple
Steps, LIFEHACKER (Aug. 2, 2010, 9:00 AM), http://lifehacker.com/5601586/how-to-get-
started-with-usenet-in-three-simple-steps.
91 Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1121.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 See id. at 1126–27.
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nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web
site.95
This paragraph forms the basis for the now-famous “Zippo test”
for specific personal jurisdiction derived from Internet contacts.  As
the court suggested, it can be understood graphically as a continuum:
Interactive site
(tailored content)
E-commerce site
(sells to state consumers)
Personal
jurisdiction
No
jurisdiction
Passive site
(static content)
The court further found that the lighter company’s trademark
claims arose out of Zippo Dot Com’s forum-related contacts because
the USENET messages transmitted to Pennsylvania users contained
the Zippo mark and because Zippo Manufacturing experienced harm
in its home state.96  Strangely, the sliding scale appears to be dicta: the
court relied principally on the commercial relationships formed be-
tween the USENET service, on one side, and Pennsylvania users and
ISPs, on the other.97  The Zippo test is unnecessary to the Zippo case
itself—the contractual arrangements, which fall at the e-commerce
side of the sliding scale, are undoubtedly sufficient for specific juris-
diction.98  The test, then, was an intellectual exercise—an attempt to
assemble existing cyber-precedent into a rule.
That effort succeeded: Zippo appeared to translate the mysteries
of cyberspace into conventional commercial activity, familiar to judges
accustomed to dealing with exploding tires in California,99 helicopter
crashes in Peru,100 and car accidents in Oklahoma.101  However, Zippo
made two insidious moves.  First, it posited that purposeful availment
essentially tries to discern whether a defendant engaged in intentional
commercial activity in the forum.102  Second, it contended that courts
could measure intentional commercial activity online by tracking a
site’s interactivity, exchange of commercial information, and sales.103
Thus, purposeful availment boiled down to a Web site’s interactivity.
The logic appeared impeccable, but it was a veneer masking deeper,
unresolved problems.
95 Id. at 1124 (internal citations omitted).
96 See id. at 1127.  Where harm is experienced is, of course, a conclusion rather than a
reason when dealing with intangible interests. Cf. Cohen, supra note 3, at 809–12 (ridicul- R
ing conclusory analysis of where a corporation exists).
97 See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1125–26 (distinguishing case from “an interactivity case”).
98 See, e.g., Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1263, 1268 (6th Cir. 1996).
99 See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 105–06 (1987).
100 See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 409–10 (1984).
101 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288 (1980).
102 See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1125–26.
103 See id. at 1124.
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Zippo has become singularly influential, but its criteria bear no
obvious relationship to the underlying normative principles of
personal jurisdiction doctrine and theory.  Each supposedly logical
step suffers from a fundamental flaw.
First, equating a site’s commercial nature with purposeful avail-
ment is both over- and under-inclusive.  True, the Supreme Court has
held that when a defendant “invok[es] the benefits and protections”
of a state’s laws, personal jurisdiction may be proper.104  But those
benefits and protections often have nothing to do with commercial
exchanges.  For example, if a Pennsylvanian drives to Massachusetts
and causes a car accident, the Pennsylvanian is subject to personal
jurisdiction there, even though the incident was not commercial in
nature.105  Conversely, even when a defendant derives commercial
benefit from a product’s use in a forum, those commercial gains,
standing alone, do not justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction if
the defendant has not intentionally made contact with the forum.106
In other words, the commercial nature of an interaction is, at most, a
minor factor in the jurisdictional calculus.
Against this background, Zippo’s middle zone, in which there is
commercial information but no transaction, is significantly flawed.  It
conditions jurisdiction on the type of information that an entity
shares—commercial or noncommercial—rather than on actual activ-
ity.107  Furthermore, this approach runs contrary to well-established
precedent that mere advertising cannot support jurisdiction.108
Zippo’s test comes out the other way, at least for sites with any degree
of interactivity: jurisdiction is possible, if not likely.
Second, a site’s interactivity is a poor proxy for whether a defen-
dant has purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of a
state.  If a Web site allows a user to transmit certain information (say,
to subscribe to an electronic newsletter), that site has done nothing
more than receive information and is conceptually indistinguishable
from a company that receives letters and packages.  Outside of the
Internet context, the mere exchange of information rarely, if ever,
104 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
105 See id.; see also Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 96–97 (1978) (treating Hess as a
demonstration of purposeful availment).
106 See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295–99.  The Supreme Court has sug-
gested that the commercial nature of an exchange might help identify whether a defen-
dant has derived benefits and protections from a given state, but it has never held that
commerciality is either necessary or sufficient for finding purposeful availment. See Kulko,
436 U.S. at 97.
107 See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
108 See, e.g., Federated Rural Elec. Ins. Corp. v. Kootenai Elec. Coop., 17 F.3d 1302,
1305 (10th Cir. 1994); Singletary v. B.R.X., Inc., 828 F.2d 1135, 1136 (5th Cir. 1987); Tran-
scraft Corp. v. Doonan Trailer Corp., No. 97 C 4943, 1997 WL 733905, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
17, 1997).
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suffices to justify personal jurisdiction.109  Web services such as the
DuckDuckGo search engine are highly interactive, but expressly not
linked to geography.110  Perhaps Zippo’s most notable deviation from
the usual jurisdictional rules comes in Internet defamation cases.
Under Zippo, a passive site displaying defamatory information would
not expose a defendant to jurisdiction in the place where a plaintiff
experiences the effects of defamation.  Such a result runs headlong
into the Calder test, which assuredly would permit jurisdiction.111
If interactivity involves obtaining and using information to tailor
a Web site to a user’s geographic location, a defendant arguably has
done more to target a particular forum.  But without any actual activ-
ity in that forum, the site has not fulfilled the usual requirements of
purposeful availment.  In an oblique sense, the defendant might be
more likely to predict that it could be amenable to jurisdiction in a
given location.  For example, if a site uses geolocation to classify a user
as residing in Brooklyn and then displays advertisements for Brooklyn
restaurants, the entity running the site might more readily predict
that a New York court could seek jurisdiction than if the site were
ignorant of location.112  The Supreme Court has made abundantly
clear, though, that foreseeability is circular and is not the touchstone
of personal jurisdiction.113
Finally, the Zippo test itself functions poorly.  It is either redun-
dant in cases that long-standing doctrine easily resolves or unworkable
in cases that demand a new mode of analysis.  At the two extremes of
the spectrum, Zippo adds nothing to traditional analysis.  E-commerce
sites, plainly subject to jurisdiction under Zippo, are uncontroversially
haled into court in the states where they have transacted business and
those transactions give rise to the lawsuit in question.114  That result is
completely consonant with decades-old specific jurisdiction concepts.
At the other end of the spectrum, a purely passive Web site essentially
functions as a virtual billboard.  Again, traditional analysis already sug-
gests the result that Zippo reaches: mere advertisement in a forum,
109 See, e.g., Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1360
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that, in the patent context, “cease-and-desist letters alone do not
suffice to justify personal jurisdiction”).
110 See Privacy, DUCKDUCKGO, https://duckduckgo.com/privacy (last visited Apr. 7,
2015).
111 See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–90 (1984).
112 Cf. Steven Cook & Miten Sampat, The Benefits of Geolocation Marketing, FORBES (Nov.
7, 2011, 12:24 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2011/11/07/the-benefits-of-
geolocation-marketing/ (arguing that to be successful, “online marketing needs to be
hyperlocalized—and it isn’t”).
113 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295–97 (1980).
114 See, e.g., Signazon Corp. v. Nickelson, No. 13-11190-RGS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
86793, at *6–7 (D. Mass. June 20, 2013).
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without more, is insufficient to subject a defendant to personal
jurisdiction.
The hard cases involve the middle range of the scale, in which
courts must assess the level of interactivity and the commercial nature
of the information transfer.  Purely passive Web sites have become a
rarity in the world of Web 2.0.  Indeed, the dot com boom—where
interaction with the user was key—began shortly after Zippo was de-
cided.115  In the middle ground, though, the two elements are stan-
dards, not rules.  Interactivity varies; some sites are highly customized,
some minimally.116  Commerciality is similarly ranged.117  And even if
the Zippo standards were reasonable proxies of the values underlying
personal jurisdiction, they offer no guideposts to help courts through
the necessary analysis.118  How much interactivity is enough?  What
counts as commercial information?  It is also not clear how the two
elements of the middle range interact.  Would a highly interactive but
noncommercial site—say, one offering information about where to
donate used clothing to charities in the user’s local area—face juris-
diction in the forum state?  What about a heavily commercial site—
perhaps one offering trailers for a soon-to-be-released movie—that
was static except for displaying the correct local time in the user’s lo-
cation?  In short, Zippo is indeterminate where it is needed most:
Interactive site
(tailored content)
Difficult cases
E-commerce site
(sells to state consumers)
Personal
jurisdiction
No
jurisdiction
Passive site
(static content)
Put bluntly, the Zippo court’s highly influential test is both wrong
and useless.  It fails to take account of the normative underpinnings of
personal jurisdiction doctrine, and it fails to help courts decide the
difficult cases for Internet-based information exchange.
115 See JOHN CASSIDY, DOT.CON: THE GREATEST STORY EVER SOLD 135 (2002) (“By the
spring of 1997, e-commerce companies were proliferating like bacteria.”).
116 See, e.g., Marketa Trimble, Twitter’s Country-Specific Content Blocking Raises Questions
about the Efficacy of Geolocation (Guest Blog Post), TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Oct. 25, 2012),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/10/twitters_preced.htm (discussing Twitter’s
customized filtering of content by country); DUCKDUCKGO, supra note 110 (minimal R
customization).
117 Compare People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359,
365–66 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding site commercial based on links to other commercial sites),
with Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 320 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding site noncommercial
despite link to online bookseller site).
118 For discussions of standards versus rules, see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:
An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83
CALIF. L. REV. 953 (1995).
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Despite these flaws, Zippo remains exceedingly influential, even as
some courts have begun to question its utility.  Of the thirteen federal
circuits, two use the original Zippo or a Zippo -like test to resolve these
issues; two use a “Zippo plus” approach, typically the sliding scale plus
“something more”; five circuits employ standard purposeful availment
methodology (sometimes relying on Zippo, although two circuits have
rejected the interactivity metric); and four have yet to rule definitively
(although two of these have pro-Zippo language in either dicta or dis-
trict court rulings).
FIGURE 1. TREATMENT OF ZIPPO TEST BY CIRCUIT
Circuit Test for Specific Jurisdiction on Internet
First No First Circuit ruling, but implicit endorsement of Zippo119
Second Purposeful availment—implicitly rejects Zippo120
Third Zippo plus “something more”121
Fourth Zippo plus122
Fifth Purposeful availment—Zippo merely one factor123
Sixth Zippo124
Seventh Purposeful availment—expressly rejects Zippo125
Eighth Zippo126
Ninth Purposeful availment—needs “something more” than Zippo127
Tenth No Tenth Circuit ruling128
Eleventh Purposeful availment—notes criticism of Zippo129
D.C. No D.C. Circuit ruling—suggestions in district court opinions of Zippo like
test130
Federal No Federal Circuit ruling131
119 See Signazon Corp. v. Nickelson, No. 13-11190-RGS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86793, at
*6 (D. Mass. June 20, 2013) (stating that the Zippo test “has been adopted by this court
(and implicitly by the First Circuit)”).
120 See Best Van Lines v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 252 (2d Cir. 2007).
121 See Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 452–54 (3d Cir. 2003).
122 See ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th Cir.
2002).
123 See Pervasive Software, Inc. v. Lexware GmbH & Co. KG, 688 F.3d 214, 227 n.7 (5th
Cir. 2012).
124 See Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 890 (6th Cir. 2002); see
also See, Inc. v. Imago Eyewear Pty, 167 Fed. Appx. 518, 522–23 (6th Cir. 2006) (using
Zippo test to determine personal jurisdiction).
125 See Illinois v. Hemi Group LLC, 622 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2010).
126 See Lakin v. Prudential Sec. Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 711 (8th Cir. 2003).
127 See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1997).
128 See Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235, 1242 n.5 (10th Cir. 2011).
129 See Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1355 n.10 (11th Cir.
2013).
130 See Virgin Records Am. Inc. v. John Does 1-35, No. 05-1918 (CKK), 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20652, at *12 (D.D.C. Apr. 18, 2006).
131 See Trintec Indus. Inc. v. Pedre Promotional Prods. Inc., 395 F.3d 1275, 1281 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (declining to rule on the Zippo test).
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The “something more” approach exemplifies Zippo’s problems.
The Zippo portion of the test appears to perform a useful function, but
in the broad range of cases where it is indeterminate, courts fall back
to standard purposeful availment analysis.132  As a tiebreaker, these
courts employ the approach that they could have used initially, saving
the useless intermediate work.
Why did Zippo—a test from a single district court case in Penn-
sylvania—come to dominate analysis of Internet contacts and specific
jurisdiction?  The likely answers are the appearance of efficiency and
technological timidity.
Personal jurisdiction analysis is notoriously complex; it involves a
multipronged test, in which each prong employs a standard rather
than a rule.133  Courts are composed of human judges who are wont
to seek cognitive shortcuts like everyone else.134  The Zippo slid-
ing-scale seems to reduce the burden of specific jurisdiction analysis
by concentrating on a deceptively simple criterion: the interactivity of
the defendant’s Web site or Internet presence.135  Unlike fairness, for
example, interactivity is readily perceptible upon inspection and pur-
ports to capture what purposeful availment means for Internet activ-
ity.  Moreover, the scale appears to be continuous rather than
binary—as interactivity of a commercial site increases, the likelihood
of personal jurisdiction increases.  The metric looks more carefully
graduated than it is, giving it the guise of being fine tuned.
Second, Zippo offered courts a useful roadmap for technologically
timid judges to navigate an unfamiliar and technologically complex
landscape: the Internet.  Most judges were not well positioned to un-
derstand the complexities of Internet protocols, JavaScript, or
e-commerce in 1997.136  The Zippo test seemed to boil the welter of
132 See, e.g., Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d at 418, 419–20.
133 See, e.g., Pervasive Software, Inc. v. Lexware GmbH & Co. KG, 688 F.3d 214, 221–22
(5th Cir. 2012) (analyzing sufficient prelitigation connections to forum state, purposeful
establishment of connections by defendant, relatedness to cause of action, and reasonable-
ness for specific jurisdiction); Illinois v. Hemi Group LLC, 622 F.3d 754, 757–60 (7th Cir.
2010) (analyzing minimum contacts, relatedness, and fairness for same).
134 See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477–79 (1998); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1128 (1974).
135 See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa.
1997); see also Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 890–91 (6th Cir.
2002) (finding that the granting of passwords to website members to access test results
indicated interactive use and thus purposeful availment).
136 Many still are not.  Consider the following colloquy between Chief Justice John
Roberts and attorney Alexander Ross in Nicastro.  Roberts: “Do you—are web sites targeted
to the United States?  Don’t you—you can—let’s say they put it on their web site in En-
gland.  Can’t you—can’t—can’t I access that from here?”  Ross: “Yes, you can.”  Roberts:
“So they don’t even have to send the web site to the United States?”  Transcript of Oral
Argument at 55, J. McIntyre Mach. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (No. 09-1343), 2011
U.S. Trans. LEXIS 3.
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technologies and acronyms down to a manageable calculus.  Stepping
away from its single metric would require judges to assess how
packet-based communication that is indifferent to geographic bound-
aries affected personal jurisdiction concerns that courts had devel-
oped when regular broadcast television was less than a decade old.137
It is unsurprising, then, that the first federal circuit court of appeals to
reject the Zippo approach was the Ninth Circuit—the court with juris-
diction over Silicon Valley.138  Technological timidity is a
well-documented phenomenon among courts and legislators alike.139
Zippo seemed to take the new phenomenon of the Internet in passing,
and courts were largely happy not to look behind the curtain.
In short, Zippo offered false hope.  Personal jurisdiction in the
Internet context has gone awry but for reasons that transcend the In-
ternet itself.
II
REASSESSING THE PROBLEM
A. Personal Jurisdiction’s Principles
For the better part of two decades, courts have lost sight of the
principles that underlie personal jurisdiction.  They have focused on
the notions of minimum contacts and purposeful availment, and they
have drawn often inapt and superficial analogies to the pre-Internet
world.  This approach has wrought theoretical and practical confu-
sion—particularly in Internet cases—and the only way out of the mo-
rass is to return to first principles.
Personal jurisdiction essentially consists of limitations on courts’
power to command that a defendant appear.  Unraveling the tests and
analogies that have been glommed on to one another begins with an
appreciation of the different sources that produced those limitations.
Identifying the precise source of each limitation in turn reveals the
values that they protect and the extent to which courts and legisla-
tures can revise and adapt those limitations.140
137 The first regularly scheduled television broadcasts began in 1939, six years before
International Shoe was decided. See Nick Greene, Celebrate Broadcast Television’s 75th Birthday
by Watching Its First Program, MENTAL FLOSS (Apr. 30, 2014), http://mentalfloss.com/arti-
cle/56485/celebrate-broadcast-televisions-75th-birthday-watching-its-first-program.
138 See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1997); cf. White v.
Samsung Elecs. Am. Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1521 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) (noting that “[f]or better or worse, we are the Court of Ap-
peals for the Hollywood Circuit”).
139 See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1011, 1038–40
(2014) [hereinafter Bambauer, Ghost in the Network]; Derek E. Bambauer, Rules, Standards,
and Geeks, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 49, 52 (2010) (noting that regulators “may not
know what technologies are cutting-edge or appropriate”).
140 See Trammell, supra note 24, at 536–46. R
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We argue that the doctrine has three tiers.  Although the Court
has not explicitly conceptualized personal jurisdiction in this way, the
tripartite formulation demonstrates the different ways that courts and
legislatures have attempted to give greater content to the overarching
notions of fairness and predictability that animate the doctrine.  This
formulation also exposes the true breadth of possibility for reassessing
and tweaking personal jurisdiction.  The first tier comprises truly con-
stitutional elements of personal jurisdiction.  The second includes
subconstitutional, prudential limitations that the Supreme Court has
imposed in common law fashion.  In prior work, one of us has argued
that most aspects of personal jurisdiction actually belong in this tier,
even though the Court rhetorically places them in the first.141  Finally,
the third deals with state-based limits on the extent to which state
courts exercise power over defendants.
Within the first tier are the limitations that the Constitution di-
rectly imposes.  The Court has long identified the Due Process Clauses
as the font of these restrictions.142  The hallmark of procedural due
process is protecting parties against the arbitrary exercise of govern-
mental power.143  In other words, the Constitution mandates that a
court may not act arbitrarily by haling a party into court.
The nonarbitrariness concept requires that a forum have some
minimal connection to either the lawsuit or the defendant for a defen-
dant to be amenable to personal jurisdiction.144  This notion protects
two closely related values.  First, it prevents courts from exercising
power in a way that exposes the defendant to unconstitutional sur-
prise and inconvenience.145  Second, it captures an important notion
about state sovereignty.  Unless a forum has the requisite connection
to the suit or defendant, its courts will exceed their sovereign author-
ity and thus expose the defendant to a different, albeit related, form
of arbitrariness.146  For example, a defendant who lives in Delaware,
just outside Philadelphia, might experience no inconvenience if a
Philadelphia court attempted to exercise jurisdiction over her.  But if
141 See id. at 541–46.
142 See James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction: Implica-
tions for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 209–13 (2004) (tracing this development to
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878)); cf. Borchers, supra note 21, at 49–51 (arguing R
that the “expansive view of Pennoyer”—that the Due Process Clause directly regulates state
courts’ adjudicative power—did not take hold until the early twentieth century).
143 See Spencer, supra note 21, at 634, 636; Trammell, supra note 24, at 529–33. But see R
E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & TONI M. MASSARO, THE ARC OF DUE PROCESS IN AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 169–203 (2013) (presenting personal jurisdiction as a hybrid substantive and
procedural due process right).
144 See Spencer, supra note 21, at 634–35; Trammell, supra note 24, at 530–31. R
145 See Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical
Evaluation, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1112, 1137–38 (1981).
146 See Spencer, supra note 21, at 641–42; Trammell, supra note 24, at 532–33. R
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Pennsylvania has no actual connection to the lawsuit or the
defendant, its courts’ attempts to exercise jurisdiction would be an
arbitrary assertion of judicial power.
The bar imposed by the Constitution is actually quite low.147  Im-
agine that two parties from Oregon and Idaho negotiate a construc-
tion contract over the phone in their respective home states and
execute it at a meeting in Seattle, Washington.  The parties are to per-
form the contract in several places in the western United States.
There is nothing arbitrary about any of those states asserting personal
jurisdiction, even if another state has a stronger connection to the
underlying lawsuit.  It would be arbitrary, however, for Maine courts
to assert jurisdiction.  Because the standards of procedural due pro-
cess are so forgiving, the Constitution prohibits only the most
bald-faced arbitrariness.148  Such attempts at truly arbitrary assertions
of judicial power are almost nonexistent.149
The bulk of the limitations that govern personal jurisdiction actu-
ally belong in the second tier: prudential, common law restrictions
that are inspired—but not required—by the Constitution.  Admit-
tedly, the Supreme Court for decades has couched its personal juris-
diction jurisprudence in terms of constitutional imperatives, but
strictly speaking, the Court has mischaracterized the source of the re-
strictions.  James Weinstein has traced the common law origins of per-
sonal jurisdiction in the United States and concluded that nearly all of
personal jurisdiction’s strictures are common law in nature.150
The better understanding of most rules articulated by the
Supreme Court—including purposeful availment and the myriad rea-
sonableness factors—is that they are designed to promote fairness,
particularly to defendants, and predictability.  The Court repeatedly
has noted the value of clarity when crafting jurisdictional rules.151
Such rules aspire to resolve threshold questions quickly and thereby
avoid satellite litigation about matters that often have little bearing on
a case’s underlying merits.152  If we are correct that these rules consti-
tute a form of federal common law—decision rules that assist in effec-
tuating constitutional norms but are not required by any specific
147 See Spencer, supra note 21, at 632 (arguing that inconvenience hardly ever rises to R
the level of unconstitutionality); see also Borchers, supra note 21, at 100 (arguing that states’ R
attempts to exercise jurisdiction are rarely unconstitutional).
148 See Borchers, supra note 21, at 90, 100; Weinstein, supra note 142, at 255. R
149 See Patrick J. Borchers, Jurisdictional Pragmatism: International Shoe’s Half-Buried
Legacy, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 561, 578 (1995).
150 See Weinstein, supra note 142, at 222–50. R
151 See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014); Hertz Corp. v. Friend,
559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010).
152 See Hertz, 559 U.S. at 94.
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constitutional provision—then Congress can amend those rules.153
Until the Supreme Court clarifies the precise source and nature of the
rules, though, this potentially productive dialogue between the courts
and Congress cannot happen.
Finally, the third tier encompasses further restrictions that a sov-
ereign may impose voluntarily.  Usually such restrictions come in the
form of long-arm statutes.  Even if the Court, through its constitu-
tional and prudential rules, permits a state to exercise jurisdiction, a
litigant must still find statutory authorization—a long-arm statute that
explicitly permits suit in the forum’s courts.154  Of course, a state may
not exercise jurisdiction beyond what the Court has authorized.
While many states have conferred jurisdiction on their courts to the
full extent permitted by the Supreme Court, others have adopted nar-
rower long-arm statutes.155
Perhaps the most conspicuous example of a sovereign’s decision
not to grant its courts the full measure of permissible jurisdiction is
the federal long-arm statute.  The federal government is a single sov-
ereign.  Thus, if a defendant has minimum contacts with the United
States writ large, then any federal court could constitutionally exercise
personal jurisdiction.  Occasionally, Congress has authorized such an
expansive approach in the federal courts.156  But the default rule is
that a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction only to the ex-
tent that the law of the state in which it sits has authorized jurisdic-
tion.  In other words, federal courts usually borrow state long-arm
statutes.157
To the extent that long-arm statutes impose additional restric-
tions on personal jurisdiction, those limitations are amenable to
change.  A legislature always has the latitude to modify its long-arm
153 See Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1,
18–20 (1975); Trammell, supra note 24, at 544–46; Weinstein, supra note 142, at 278. But R
see Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 36–38 n.128 (2004)
(rejecting notion that constitutional common law necessarily is subject to congressional
override).
154 See Douglas D. McFarland, Dictum Run Wild: How Long-Arm Statutes Extended to the
Limits of Due Process, 84 B.U. L. REV. 491, 493 (2004).
155 See id. at 525–26 (identifying eighteen states that have narrower, enumerated-acts
statutes).
156 For example, the Securities and Exchange Act permits nationwide service of pro-
cess.  15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a) (2013).  And in rare situations, a federal court may exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant on a cause of action arising under federal law
when the defendant has minimum contacts with the United States as a whole, but not any
particular state. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2).
157 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A); see also, e.g., Graduate Mgmt. Admissions Council v.
Raju, 241 F. Supp. 2d 589, 592–93 (E.D. Va. 2003) (applying Rule 4(k)(1)(A) and thus
Virginia’s long-arm statute).  This exercise in humility in the federal long-arm statute is
actually quite prudent.  If Congress authorized federal courts to take a massively expansive
approach to personal jurisdiction, the federal courts would become a magnet for plaintiffs.
Instead, Congress has sought to foster symmetry between state and federal courts.
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statute, and a state’s highest court can always construe the statute
more broadly or more narrowly, provided that the statute reaches no
further than the Supreme Court has permitted.158
An overview of the three tiers reveals the principles that have
animated personal jurisdiction and impelled its evolution.  The truly
constitutional restrictions protect basic notions of constitutional fair-
ness and state sovereignty.  But only the most egregious attempts at
asserting personal jurisdiction will run afoul of the Due Process
Clauses.  A state’s exercise of judicial power would have to be com-
pletely arbitrary to implicate the Constitution.
Virtually all of the other restrictions are a product of either fed-
eral common law (and thus subject to revision by Congress) or a
long-arm statute that a legislature may always revise.  These additional
restrictions promote subconstitutional concerns for fairness, predict-
ability, and clarity.159  They narrow the places where a defendant is
amenable to suit.  Moreover, they create mechanisms by which de-
fendants can tailor their conduct and thereby avoid jurisdiction.  As
courts attempt to craft jurisdictional rules for the Internet context,
they should look behind the familiar phrases—“minimum contacts,”
“purposeful availment,” “reasonableness,” and the like—to avoid un-
helpful analogies to the world of physical trucks and tubes.160  Only by
refocusing attention on the first principles that have guided the devel-
opment of the doctrine can courts hope to create meaningful limita-
tions for the modern era.
Our tripartite interpretation offers a nuanced vision of how the
doctrine seeks to effectuate personal jurisdiction’s overarching con-
cerns.  It also reveals a tremendous berth for the Supreme Court and
Congress to innovate within and around the doctrine’s current stric-
158 See Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
119, 122, 133 (2001) (noting trend among state courts to construe seemingly narrow long-
arm statutes to reach the full extent permitted by the Supreme Court).
159 Occasionally, the Supreme Court treats some of these additional limitations as pro-
tectors of interstate federalism. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 293 (1980) (invoking interstate federalism as part of personal jurisdiction analy-
sis).  But even a recent attempt to reinvigorate the sovereignty rationale ultimately
sounded in notions of fairness. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780,
2787–88 (2011) (plurality opinion); see also Wendy Collins Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got
to Do with It? Due Process, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. REV. 729,
741–43 (2012).  In Nicastro, a shearing machine made its way through the distribution
chain to New Jersey and caused harm there to a New Jersey resident. See 131 S. Ct. at 2786.
It is nearly impossible to see how New Jersey did not have a regulatory interest in protect-
ing its citizens from machines that were sold in New Jersey and caused harm there.  The
only possible explanation for why personal jurisdiction was not permissible was because of
a concern for fairness to the defendant.
160 Senator Ted Stevens’s infamous quote is from a speech on network neutrality on
June 28, 2006. Series of Tubes, YouTube (June 28, 2006), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v
=F99PcP0aFNE (“And again, the Internet is not something that you just dump something
on.  It’s not a big truck.  It’s a series of tubes.”).
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tures.  But even if the Court continues to treat its pronouncements as
truly constitutional (rather than prudential) in nature, Congress and
state legislatures ultimately may adopt the proposal that we develop.
Because our proposal narrows the scope of courts’ adjudicative power,
legislatures may incorporate it into their respective long-arm statutes.
The tripartite approach creates greater space for dialogue between
institutions about how best to instantiate certain procedural values,
and such a dialogue in itself would be a virtue.  But the specific result
that we advocate here is achievable even within the current under-
standing of the doctrine.161
B. Cyberspace’s Problems
Internet communication wreaks havoc on personal jurisdiction.
As courts currently conceive it, personal jurisdiction is physical
and territorial.  The traditional bases for asserting personal jurisdic-
tion over an individual were purely territorial: a person was subject to
jurisdiction in his domicile or wherever he was physically present.162
Even the more modern basis, specific jurisdiction, relies in part on a
certain physicality—minimum contacts between the defendant and
the forum.163  Physical location is both critically important and easy to
determine.
The default rule for the core Internet protocols, by contrast, is
that physical location is not relevant—it is a quaint remnant of older
modes of communication.164  The transfer of information between
161 If the Supreme Court reconceptualizes the doctrine along the lines of the tripartite
formulation, the Court itself would also be able to engage in the process of crafting the
limitations that we suggest.  Under current doctrine, though, only legislatures have the
power to craft such prudential limitations.  Moreover, the current approach, unlike the
tripartite understanding, creates something of a one-way ratchet that allows legislatures to
narrow, but not expand, courts’ adjudicative jurisdiction.  (Apologies to John Harrison,
who has long argued that “one-way ratchet” is redundant because the whole point of a
ratchet is to go only one way at a time. See John Harrison, Forms of Originalism and the Study
of History, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 83, 90–91 (2003).)
162 See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610–12 (1990); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714, 722, 727 (1878).
163 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 319 (1945).
164 See Paul Wilson, The Geography of Internet Addressing, APNIC (Apr. 15, 2005), http://
www.ripe.net/internet-coordination/internet-governance/multi-stakeholder-engagement/
itu/internetgeography.pdf; J.H. Saltzer, D.P. Reed, & D.D. Clark, End-to-End Arguments in
System Design, 2 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER SYSTEMS 277, 277–79 (1984).  There are
exceptions.  Users physically located in China or Saudi Arabia will experience a different,
censored Internet from what users located elsewhere see because China and Saudi Arabia
constructed their networks to mirror national borders. See Derek E. Bambauer, Orwell’s
Armchair, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 863, 876–77 (2012).  And people outside the United States
trying to reach George W. Bush’s campaign Web site in 2004, or Hulu today, will be unsuc-
cessful. See Bulletin 007, OPENNET INITIATIVE (Oct. 27, 2004), https://opennet.net/
bulletins/007/; Luke Hopewell, How To Stream Netflix And Hulu In Australia, And Other Stuff
Geoblockers Don’t Want Known, GIZMODO AUSTL. (Nov. 25, 2013, 10:31 AM), http://www.
gizmodo.com.au/2013/11/how-to-stream-netflix-and-hulu-in-australia-and-other-stuff-geo
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sender and receiver depends upon their locations on the network, not
on the planet.165  Physical and virtual locations may coincide or
not.166  And, determining where an Internet user is located ranges
from quite easy (via geolocation services that check Internet protocol
addresses)167 to nearly impossible (via Tor, which encrypts communi-
cations and routes them through a series of proxies).168  For personal
jurisdiction, physical location is a fundamental matter; for Internet
communication, it is peripheral or even irrelevant.
The Internet’s indifference to geography complicates purposeful
availment analysis.169  A blogger has clearly availed herself of the ben-
efits of the forum state where she resides.  Perhaps the same is true of
the state where the server hosting her site is located, but even here,
technology in the form of cloud computing complicates the analy-
sis.170  Beyond that basic—and still principally geographic—analysis, it
is difficult to assess whether and to what extent the blogger has pur-
posefully directed her activity to any other states.  Absent other con-
tacts, such as contractual relationships, the only principled answers
seem to be all states or none. All—subjecting the blogger to jurisdic-
tion in every state in which her site is accessible—engages in a legal
fiction whereby the blogger theoretically benefits from the protections
of a state where a user might access the blog.171  Even if that interac-
blockers-dont-want-known/. See generally Marketa Trimble, The Future of Cybertravel: Legal
Implications of the Evasion of Geolocation, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 567
(2012).  As usual, the exceptions highlight the force of the rule.
165 Wilson, supra note 164. R
166 See Trimble, supra note 164, at 654–57. R
167 See, e.g., IP Intelligence & Geolocation, NEUSTAR, http://www.neustar.biz/services/ip-
intelligence (last visited May 12, 2015).
168 Overview, TOR, https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en (last visited
May 12, 2015).  To track users trafficking in child pornography via Tor, the FBI had to
resort to using malware. See also Kevin Poulsen, FBI Admits It Controlled Tor Servers Behind
Mass Malware Attack, WIRED (Sept. 13, 2013, 4:17 PM), http://www.wired.com/2013/09/
freedom-hosting-fbi/.
169 See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 98 IOWA L. REV.
1163, 1181 (2013) (noting that “[i]f ‘minimum contacts’ and ‘purposeful availment’ are to
survive as sensible talismans for personal-jurisdiction jurisprudence, the meaning of these
phrases will have to evolve to account for the realities of an Internet-based world”).
170 Cloud computing may distribute copies of data across multiple servers for purposes
of redundancy, balancing load, and efficiency.  Thus, a user who sets up a WordPress blog
on Amazon’s EC2 service knows she is transacting with a company whose headquarters are
in Washington, but likely does not know whether her data resides on Amazon Web Services
computers in Virginia, Oregon, or California. See Global Infrastructure, AMAZON WEB SER-
VICES, https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/globalinfrastructure; see also Derek E.
Bambauer, Conundrum, 96 MINN. L. REV. 584, 638–42 (2011) (describing how cloud com-
puting technologies can store information in multiple locations that may not be transpar-
ent to users).
171 For illustrations of courts taking this approach, see, for example, Heroes Inc. v.
Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1996); Maritz Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F.
Supp. 1328, 1330–33 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp.
161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996).
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tion actually comes to fruition, it is entirely by the user’s choice, not
the blogger’s. None cuts the other way: physicality triumphs, and on-
line interaction alone cannot suffice for jurisdiction.  Purposeful avail-
ment on the Internet encounters the same troubles that the doctrine
does in stream of commerce cases.  Like tiny electronic Volkswagens,
or cutting machines, data packets go forth to locations ultimately un-
known to the sender.172
The Net also disrupts effects-based tests for personal jurisdiction.
The default setting for communication is universal accessibility: a new
blog is equally accessible in Tacoma, Tashkent, and Tucson.  Unless
she takes special steps, the blogger has no information about the loca-
tion or identity of the people who read her posts.173  The information
she provides could have effects everywhere or nowhere.  She can en-
gage in technological self-help and essentially withdraw from certain
physical locations (perhaps by screening out IP addresses correlated
with particular states), but such measures are imperfect and orthogo-
nal to effects-based analysis.174  Self-help on the Net—a person’s abil-
ity to make certain information unavailable in particular states and,
perhaps more cynically, to prevent that state’s courts from haling her
before them—seems irrelevant for both practical and theoretical rea-
sons.175  From a practical perspective, effective self-help avoids the
question: a perfect defense means that the defendant has always pre-
vented certain information from being accessible in the forum and
means that no plaintiff has a plausible claim there.  The moment
self-help fails, though (when information slips through the virtual
cracks and winds up in the forum), the problem recurs, and courts
must decide how to weigh imperfect measures to avoid the particular
forum.  And, from a theoretical perspective, the question of self-help
rarely arises offline.  Only in the contractual setting, in which parties
mutually agree in advance to avoid jurisdiction in a particular court,
172 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980); J. McIn-
tyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2790 (2011); cf. United States v. Jones, 132 S.
Ct. 945, 958 n.3 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (mocking majority opin-
ion’s “tiny constable” approach).
173 See Sarah Gooding, How to Display WordPress Post Content Based on a User’s GeoLoca-
tion, WPMU DEV (July 6, 2011), http://premium.wpmudev.org/blog/daily-tip-how-to-dis
play-wordpress-posts-based-on-a-users-geolocation/.
174 See, e.g., Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–90 (1984) (focusing not on the presence
of readers in California, but on the presence of Jones’s professional reputation there).
175 See, e.g., Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d
1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting technical report suggesting Yahoo!, in 2000, could iden-
tify seventy percent of French users of its Web site and thus block access to Nazi-related
content for those users); Trimble, supra note 164, at 599–605 (discussing the ease with R
which users could evade geolocation tools). But see Tracie E. Wandell, Geolocation and Juris-
diction: From Purposeful Availment to Avoidance and Targeting on the Internet, 16 J. TECH. L. &
POL’Y 275, 295–304 (2011) (arguing for personal jurisdiction standard that incorporates
geolocation capabilities).
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does self-help have any salience.176  Otherwise, the notion of self-help
in the real, as opposed to the virtual, world seems somewhat confused,
because the whole point of an effects-based test is that the plaintiff can
sue where she experiences harm.177
Courts and policymakers struggled to reconcile a technology and
a doctrine that were, and are, so fundamentally in tension.  The pre-
dominant response was Internet exceptionalism: crafting special rules
for cyberspace, most notably the Zippo test,178 but also including im-
munity for intermediaries hosting potentially tortious third-party con-
tent179 and expanded in rem jurisdiction over domain names that
infringe trademarks.180  This felt need to treat Internet problems with
bespoke doctrinal solutions was the heart of the cyberexceptionalist
approach, which saw the Internet as a fundamental challenge not only
to offline rules, but to offline rulers.181  Internet scholars, though,
quickly abandoned Internet exceptionalism for cyber-realism, particu-
larly when real-space sovereigns proved perfectly capable of enforcing
their writ online.182  In substantive doctrine, courts too have moved to
align offline and online rules, including in areas such as copyright,183
trademark,184 trespass to chattels,185 and contracts.186  With personal
jurisdiction, though, most federal courts187 persist in a sort of mud-
dled cyberexceptionalism, hoping that a blend of Zippo -style unique
rules188 and “something more”189 (plus, perhaps, eye of newt and toe
of frog)190 will resolve the fundamental tensions that the Net
generates.
176 See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 590–95 (1991) (creating pre-
sumption that forum selection clauses designating a reasonable forum are valid).
177 See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776–77 (1984).
178 See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
179 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2013). See generally David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or
Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Com-
munications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L. REV. 373 (2010).
180 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2) (2013).
181 Compare Johnson & Post, supra note 16 at 1387–1400 (outlining classic cyberexcep- R
tionalist approach), and David G. Post, Against “Against Cyberanarchy,” 17 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1365, 1373–87 (2002) (same), with Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1199, 1244–50 (1998) (articulating cyberrealist approach).
182 See Derek E. Bambauer, Censorship v.3.1, 17 IEEE INTERNET COMPUTING 26, 26–27
(2013); Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace As/And Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210, 211 (2007).
183 See Am. Broad. Co. v. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2506–07 (2014) (equating Aereo’s
activities to those of traditional community antenna television companies).
184 See Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 106–08 (2d Cir. 2010).
185 See Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 304 (Cal. 2003).
186 See Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 28–38 (2d Cir. 2002).
187 The Seventh Circuit is a notable exception. See, e.g., Illinois v. Hemi Group LLC,
622 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2010) (applying traditional “purposeful availment” analysis).
188 See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
189 ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 715 (4th Cir. 2002).
190 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF MACBETH Act IV, sc. 1, l.14 (Folger’s ed.
1992).
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We argue that personal jurisdiction doctrine is in need of a cyber-
realist moment.  Proxies such as the Zippo test not only fail to function
on their own terms, but also do not align with the underlying ratio-
nales for personal jurisdiction’s limits on sovereign power.  The In-
ternet presents hard problems for this doctrine.  But the point of
flexible standards grounded in shared normative commitments is to
respond to new challenges.  Below, we describe what that response
should be.
III
MINIMUM CONTACTS IN A SERIES OF TUBES
A. Going Off the Rails
For personal jurisdiction, the Internet is less different than one
might think.
This is counterintuitive.  The Net is typically presented as a revo-
lutionary change in communications technology, and we have de-
scribed the ways in which its architecture has bedeviled courts.191  Yet
for personal jurisdiction, the Internet is but one example—the most
important example—of a larger problem that the doctrine faces, and
has failed to resolve satisfactorily: intangible harms.
While the touchstones and underlying rationales for limits on
personal jurisdiction have varied over time, the common theme in the
jurisprudence is physicality: the tangible dimension of both the defen-
dant’s presence and the locus of the harm that her conduct has
caused.  There are solid practical reasons for physicality to matter to
jurisdictional analysis.  Physical harms implicate concrete interests for
the forum state.  Most obviously, the forum seeks to protect its citizens
or property.  Any harm to its citizens or property also generates con-
comitant, secondary effects, such as consumption of state resources in,
for example, the form of fire or police forces.192  Moreover, if people
or property have suffered harm in the forum state, evidence will usu-
ally be readily available there as well.
191 See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANS-
FORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 1 (2006) (“It seems passe´ today to speak of ‘the Internet
revolution’ . . . . But it should not be.  The change brought about by the networked infor-
mation environment is deep.  It is structural.  It goes to the very foundations of how liberal
markets and liberal democracies have coevolved for almost two centuries.”). But see EVGENY
MOROZOV, THE NET DELUSION: THE DARK SIDE OF INTERNET FREEDOM xiii, xvi (2011) (criti-
cizing “cyber-utopianism: a naı¨ve belief in the emancipatory nature of online communica-
tion that rests on a stubborn refusal to acknowledge its downside” and critiquing “Internet-
centrists [who] like to answer every question about democratic change by first reframing it
in terms of the Internet rather than the context in which that change is to occur”).
192 See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 637 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(“By visiting the forum State, a transient defendant actually ‘avail[s]’ himself of significant
benefits provided by the State.  His health and safety are guaranteed by the State’s police,
fire, and emergency medical services.” (citation omitted)).
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The tangible dimension of personal jurisdiction accords well with
this Article’s focus on fairness and predictability.  For fairness, permit-
ting jurisdiction at the defendant’s physical location allows that per-
son to receive rapid notice of the pending suit and to immediately
bring to bear resources available to her.  And physicality of presence
or harm offers a concrete signal to the defendant of which state or
states may have an interest in regulating her conduct, thus increasing
predictability.  At times, precedent may seem to minimize physicality,
but often this reflects attention to fairness and predictability—the un-
derlying values for the doctrine—rather than a proxy for them.  For
example, in World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court rejected jurisdiction in
the state where the physical harm occurred, because it concluded that
allowing jurisdiction would disserve those interests.193  It would have
been difficult for the New York defendants to predict where the
Robinsons would take their car; indeed, allowing jurisdiction to travel
with the automobile would have had consequences mirroring some of
the decisions in early Internet cases, where setting up a Web site pro-
duced jurisdiction in any state.194  Moreover, while the evidence from
the crash was located in Oklahoma, neither the Robinsons nor the
defendants resided there, minimizing any fairness rationale for juris-
diction.195  And in the final analysis, the Court still gave expression to
physicality in one sense: looking to where the defendants themselves
had physically shipped and sold the car.196
In the information age, however, physical harms and locations
are increasingly less of a concern than intangible ones.  Internet activ-
ity is an obvious example: harms to a trademark’s or an individual’s
reputation can occur anywhere the reputation exists and the damag-
ing information travels.  The physical location of the reputation’s
owner, the author of the information, and the server from which it
emanates are orthogonal if not irrelevant.
Superficially, Internet-based contacts can be made physical, but at
the price of adopting a formalistic approach to personal jurisdiction
analysis that ignores how the network functions.  One can make In-
ternet information physical by concentrating hard on how it propa-
gates: via electrical impulse or light pulse or radio wave.197  On this
account, packets are no different than newspapers—the latter spread
information via ink and paper, the former via changes in frequency or
193 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980).
194 There are many examples of such cases. See, e.g., Maritz Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947
F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Heroes Inc. v. Heroes Found. Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1, 5
(D.D.C. 1996); M&B Beverage Corp. v. N.Y.N.Y. Hotel, No. 96-2481-CIV-MORENO, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22926, at *19 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 27, 1996).
195 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286.
196 See id. at 298.
197 See VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 73, at 84–85 (describing link layer of TCP/IP). R
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photon state or current.198  Voice, too, is merely a series of physical
sound waves transmitted through the air.  On that view of how the
Internet operates, courts can press the old, physicality-based jurisdic-
tional rules into service.  But doing so elevates what is, at most, a sec-
ondary consideration to a place of prominence.
However, arguments that focus on the Internet’s physical ele-
ments are specious.199  Speakers have very different levels of control
over different modalities of communication.  Newspaper distribution
involves delivery to specified locales.200  Absent a delivery truck acci-
dent and spill, the papers end up (initially) only where the publisher
intends.  So, too, with voice; without enhancement technology (such
as recording or broadcast), the speaker knows quite well how far her
voice will carry.201  By default, though, Internet communication (at
least via Web site or BitTorrent or the like) is available to anyone, in
any location; the author exercises no election.  It takes real effort to
limit such distribution by geography, and even an author who tries
may fail because of the limits of geolocation technology or a user’s
ability to thwart it through circumvention.202  Users, not authors, initi-
ate distribution in the virtual world.  And as Calder proves, the physical
nature of distribution is ultimately secondary to intangible concerns,
such as the presence of a defendant’s reputation.203
Courts have stretched personal jurisdiction principles grounded
in physical space problems to meet the challenges of intangible inter-
ests and harms.  These attempts have gone badly awry from the per-
spective of personal jurisdiction’s rationales.
B. I Can Haz Jurisdiction: Which (Virtual) Contacts Count?
The challenge for personal jurisdiction is not merely to take ac-
count of Internet questions, but to arrive at a coherent approach to
intangible harms and interests grounded in the values that animate
the doctrine.  In this subpart, we outline two approaches to jurisdic-
tion over intangible interests, a broad one and a narrow one, and
198 Cf. Dow Jones & Co. v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575, para. 14 (Austl.) (Gleeson, C.J.)
(comparing Internet content to radio and television and finding little difference between
them).
199 See, e.g., Cybergold, 947 F. Supp. at 1330 (referring to the physical locations of the
defendant’s website’s server and users); Heroes, Inc., 958 F. Supp. at 4–5 (same); M & B
Beverage Corp., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22926, at *19 (same).
200 See Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 260 (4th Cir. 2002).
201 Cf. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989) (upholding rules on
sound amplification in Central Park against constitutional challenge).
202 See Trimble, supra note 164, at 599–605; Nart Villeneuve, Technical Ways to Get R
Round Censorship, in HANDBOOK FOR BLOGGERS AND CYBER-DISSIDENTS 64–65 (2005), availa-
ble at http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/handbook_bloggers_cyberdissidents-GB.pdf (discuss-
ing the various technologies that people can use to circumvent restrictions).
203 See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984).
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defend the latter method as most aligned with fairness and
predictability.
1. The Broad Approach
The broad approach extends Calder’s effects test: it treats intangi-
ble claims for IP infringement, along with intentional and quasi-inten-
tional torts (such as public disclosure of private facts), as falling under
the test.204  As a practical matter, this means that to establish jurisdic-
tion over the defendant, the plaintiff need only prove that she holds a
valid intangible interest in the forum state.
To illustrate the breadth of this approach, consider a New
York-based trademark owner who holds an unregistered mark that she
uses in advertising in the Tri-state area.205  She discovers that a Con-
necticut firm has been using the same mark on its website; that firm
does no business in New York.  Under this broad approach, the owner
could successfully bring a claim against the defendant in New York’s
courts: the mark owner has a valid intangible interest in the state, and
the alleged infringement could damage that interest.206  Following the
same logic, if the mark’s reputation extended into Massachusetts,
such as via advertising in newspapers in Worcester and Boston, the
New York mark owner would be able to sue the Connecticut defen-
dant in Massachusetts as well.  While New York and the New England
states are not geographically distant, the indeterminacy of the intangi-
ble trademark interest and the lack of scienter necessary for infringe-
ment mean that the broad approach is in considerable tension with
personal jurisdiction’s rationales.
Under this broad approach, jurisdiction flows alongside the in-
tangible interest.  This is the logical extension of Calder, but it is likely
to cause courts to examine more closely the intangible harm element
of the calculus.  As Cassandra Robertson has noted with respect to
defamation claims, the effects test forces courts to take the merits of a
claim into account surreptitiously when deciding personal jurisdiction
issues.207  Personal jurisdiction is appropriate based purely on the
204 See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 (1984) (defamation);
Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1227–32 (9th Cir. 2011) (copy-
right); Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d 1280, 1288 (11th Cir. 2008) (trademark).
205 Unregistered marks are protected from infringement under section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2013).
206 See, e.g., Lovelady, 544 F.3d at 1283–84 (stating that “although the website was cre-
ated in Tennessee, the Florida long-arm statute is satisfied if the alleged trademark in-
fringement on the website caused injury in Florida”); Nestle Prepared Foods v. Pocket
Foods Corp., No. 04-cv-02533-MSK-MEH, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26181, at *12 (D. Colo.
Apr. 5, 2007) (holding that “trademark infringement occurred in Colorado when the De-
fendants marketed their products . . . for sale in Colorado . . . . [T]he tort arises from the
marketing of the product.”).
207 See Robertson, supra note 59, at 1311–20. R
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supposed intangible harm that the plaintiff has experienced in the
forum, and whether such harm has occurred is the entire question on
the merits.
Although this bootstrapping principle has vexed courts and
scholars in the libel context, the phenomenon is not confined to one
idiosyncratic corner of the law but, instead, bedevils nearly every case
in which the harm is intangible.  For example, with unregistered
trademarks, this phenomenon is inevitable if personal jurisdiction is
appropriate wherever the plaintiff alleges that his mark has been
harmed.  Because the mark is unregistered, part of the plaintiff’s
prima facie case is to establish that it has a valid mark.208  Rights in an
unregistered mark extend geographically only so far as actual or con-
structive use, such as via advertising or other consumer recognition of
the mark.209  (The need to peek at the merits is reduced with a mark
registered on the Principal Register of the Trademark Office, since
registration provides a presumption of nationwide priority of use.)210
A court considering whether to force an out-of-state defendant to ap-
pear in a suit will likely want to consider the rough merits of the mark
owner’s claim, in order to avoid nuisance suits and to accord with the
fairness rationale.211
This approach raises costs for defendants and decreases them for
plaintiffs.  It makes jurisdiction less readily predictable for defendants,
who face suit in a greater number of fora.  To obtain greater certainty
about where they may be sued (and thus help them navigate substan-
tive differences in doctrine among states), defendants may invest
more resources to investigate the geographic reach of potential plain-
tiffs’ interests.212  In the example above, if the Connecticut firm is
aware of the New York-based mark, it may decide to check whether
the mark’s reputation extends beyond the Empire State.  This may be
a desirable effect if potential trademark infringers currently invest too
little in investigative precautions.213  An equally (or perhaps more)
likely scenario is that such behavior is socially undesirable if firms
208 See, e.g., Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270,
279 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining the requirements to prove trademark infringement).
209 See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 98 (1918); see also
Emergency One, Inc. v. Am. Fire Eagle Engine Co., 332 F.3d 264, 267–68 (4th Cir. 2003).
210 See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (2013).
211 See Robertson, supra note 59, at 1323–26 (discussing intellectual property cases tak- R
ing this approach).
212 For example, in trademark cases alleging infringement under the Lanham Act
§§ 32, 43(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a), courts employ a multifactor test, using any-
where from six to thirteen elements. Compare Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d
1228, 1239–40 (10th Cir. 2006) (six factors), with Palm Bay Imports, Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot
Ponsardin Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (thirteen factors).
213 Cf. Steven Shavell, Individual Precautions to Prevent Theft: Private Versus Socially Opti-
mal Behavior, 11 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 123, 123–26 (1991) (discussing the precautions that
people take to prevent theft of property). See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF
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invest too much in litigation-avoidance activities.214  This empirical
difficulty is compounded by information asymmetry: plaintiffs can
generally determine easily the range of their marks’ reputations, be-
cause they know about the reach of their advertising and sales, while
such data may be challenging for defendants to unearth.  Thus, the
broad approach decreases the predictability of jurisdiction, and the
unpredictability of threshold litigation matters rarely leads to a so-
cially desirable outcome.215  The broad approach increases plaintiffs’
choice of forum.  But favoring the plaintiff’s convenience over the de-
fendant’s does not create a one-for-one trade.  The modest increase in
fairness toward the plaintiff, by expanding her forum choices, likely
comes at the expense of not just inconvenience to the defendant dur-
ing litigation but also tremendous uncertainty as the defendant at-
tempts to plan his prelitigation activity.  Information asymmetry is
likely to produce higher informational costs for defendants, possibly
leading to excessive precautions under the broad approach.  Moreo-
ver, the social cost increases with the likelihood that the parties will
litigate over the appropriateness of the plaintiff’s forum choice.
In sum, the broad approach favors plaintiffs and disfavors defend-
ants, though its outcomes are in tension with both personal jurisdic-
tion’s rationales and the Constitution.
ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 26–31 (1970) (arguing that one goal of tort
law is the reduction of accident costs).
214 Cf. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW 90 (1987) (discussing risk of excessive precautions by potential tort victims); Edward
L. Rubin, Punitive Damages: Reconceptualizing the Runcible Remedies of Common Law, 1998 WIS.
L. REV. 131, 150 (1998) (discussing efficient breaches and arguing that requiring strict
compliance in contract cases may induce excessive precautions).
215 As an empirical matter, even if such unpredictability ultimately leads to socially
useful behavior by encouraging firms to conduct more research about other marks, it is
strange to think that intentional jurisdictional ambiguity is the best way to address this
problem.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of clear jurisdic-
tional rules to avoid satellite litigation on threshold issues. See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman,
134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014); Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 93–94 (2010); Navarro Sav.
Ass’n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 464 n.13 (1980).  To the extent that firms pay too little attention
to competing marks, substantive legal norms, which legislatures can calibrate as necessary,
should address that problem directly.  If courts crafting jurisdictional rules happen to cre-
ate the right amount of social deterrence through a jurisdictional shot in the dark, it is
pure happenstance—the proverbial broken clock that is right twice each day.  And Con-
gress does not hesitate to second-guess the Court’s approach to deterrence.  For example,
when the Court found that plaintiffs in trademark dilution claims must prove actual dilu-
tion, rather than the less-demanding likelihood of dilution, Congress rapidly revised the
relevant provisions of the Lanham Act to the contrary. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue,
Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003); Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
312, § 2, 120 Stat. 1730 (Oct. 6, 2006).
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2. The Narrow Approach
The second approach is a narrow one: Internet-based contacts
should rarely, if ever, suffice for personal jurisdiction.216  This ap-
proach rejects the fiction that virtual activity and harm create physical
contact with a particular territory.  Unlike a car accident that occurs in
exactly one place, intangible interests and harms, while real, are too
indeterminate to provide sufficient fairness and predictability.  Under
current doctrine, this would require resisting an expansive interpreta-
tion of Calder, as the Supreme Court has done recently.  Last year in
Walden v. Fiore, the Court made clear that Calder does not automati-
cally permit jurisdiction wherever a defendant feels the effects of an
intentional tort.217  And building on Walden, the California Court of
Appeal has held that not even every defamation case properly invokes
the effects test.  Instead, it has taken a narrow approach to Internet
defamation, requiring a plaintiff to show that “the defendant expressly
aim[ed] or specifically direct[ed] his or her intentional conduct at the
forum, rather than at a plaintiff who lives there.”218  In other words,
courts have sensibly shown an inclination to confine Calder to its facts.
Forthrightly overruling it, particularly because of its insidious influ-
ence in the realm of virtual contacts, would be better yet.  At a practi-
cal level, either outcome would mean that, for example, a defendant
infringing a trademark via a Web site would have to be sued in her
state of domicile.
This approach enhances predictability, as would most minimalist
or rule-based methods.  Defendants know that they are subject to gen-
eral, all-purpose jurisdiction in but one state (or likely just two states
for corporate defendants), and they can plan accordingly.  There may
be predictability benefits for plaintiffs, too, whose risk of expending
resources upon a suit only to have it dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
decreases.  And while some plaintiffs’ costs will increase, as they must
prepare to litigate farther from home, they are likely to wait for harm
to materialize to incur such costs, whereas defendants would be more
likely to hedge against the risk of being sued.  Moreover, society more
broadly benefits from enhanced predictability as the narrow approach
likely will consume fewer public resources to resolve a threshold
question.
Fairness likely increases as well with the narrow approach.  Per-
haps the most obvious aspect of private fairness or unfairness in the
216 But see Dustin E. Buehler, Jurisdictional Incentives, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 105,
137–45 (2012) (arguing for expansive notion of personal jurisdiction to permit legislative
tailoring of litigation incentives).
217 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123, 1125 (2014).  The Supreme Court explicitly left for another
day “questions about virtual contacts.” Id. at 1125 n.9.
218 Burdick v. Superior Court, 233 Cal. App. 4th 8, 13 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
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jurisdictional calculus is whether one party has to travel.  But usually
the burden of having to travel to the forum for trial is relatively insig-
nificant.219  Moreover, the total burden is likely to remain constant,
regardless of how courts allocate that burden between the plaintiff
and the defendant.  Whether the defendant has to travel to the plain-
tiff’s preferred forum or vice versa, the total inconvenience is the
same.  More to the point, it is quite minimal in the grand scheme of
litigation.220
The crux of private fairness, then, turns on factors quite different
than a party’s burden of traveling to the forum.  Most significantly,
fairness trains on a case’s portability—whether a party has access to
necessary evidence, including compulsory process for bringing in criti-
cal witnesses.  Here, the Internet should increase portability and re-
duce costs more generally, since documents can be filed
electronically, witnesses can be deposed by Skype, and so forth. For
precisely this reason, even though the narrow approach will restrict
the potential forums available to a plaintiff, it will not substantially
impede access to justice. If a case is fully portable, it does not really
matter where the plaintiff must litigate.
Fairness also includes larger societal interests, which have crystal-
lized in the Internet context to favor the unfettered exchange of in-
formation.221  The narrow approach to personal jurisdiction for
intangible activity and harm accords with how the United States has
approached Internet liability questions more generally.  It promotes
the free flow of information and effectively favors defendants.  First, in
the realm of substantive law, both Congress and the courts have
adapted doctrine to limit the scope of liability and to make it more
predictable.222  For example, section 230 of the Communications De-
cency Act immunizes intermediaries and their users from tort and
219 See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (“[M]odern transporta-
tion and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend
himself in a State where he engages in economic activity.”); Borchers, supra note 21, at 95 R
(arguing that the overwhelming majority of litigation cost comes in the form of pretrial
proceedings, most of which are not tied to the actual forum).
220 See supra notes 40–51 and accompanying text.  Notwithstanding the low costs of R
actual travel, some scholars have documented that the effect of transferring a case can be
significant.  Following transfer, plaintiffs generally achieve less favorable outcomes, win-
ning fewer cases and abandoning some altogether. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore
Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1518–25 (1995);
see also David W. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and England: “A Rather Fantas-
tic Fiction,” 103 LAW Q. REV. 398, 418–20 (1987) (observing a similar negative effect for
plaintiffs when defendants successfully bring forum non conveniens motions).
221 See Derek E. Bambauer, Against Jawboning, 100 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2581705, at *10–14.; H. Brian
Holland, Section 230 of the CDA: Internet Exceptionalism as a Statutory Construct, in THE NEXT
DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 189, 204–06 (Berin Szoka &
Adam Marcus, eds., 2010).
222 See Holland, supra note 221, at 190–93.
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state criminal liability that would result from treating them as the
speaker or publisher of content provided by a third party.223  Addi-
tionally, Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act provides a
safe harbor from infringement liability for intermediaries who follow
a notice-and-takedown system for accused content.224  Courts have
shaped common law doctrines of secondary liability for trademark in-
fringement to largely mirror the DMCA.225  And the Supreme Court
has interpreted the Patent Act to require that a single entity infringe a
patent in order to find a second party liable for inducement, effec-
tively making secondary liability for Internet-based method patents
more difficult to prove.226
These doctrinal modifications serve distinctly utilitarian ends: to
achieve the Internet’s promise as a medium, speakers and in-
termediaries must not be chilled by the threat of liability.227  We have
deliberately tilted the table towards potential defendants and away
from potential plaintiffs as a mechanism for protecting open commu-
nication online, in the belief that society as a whole benefits.228  While
many of these changes benefit intermediaries—third parties in com-
munications transactions that occur online—there is no clear reason
to distinguish between first and third parties.229  Procedural limits on
the places where an Internet user can be sued for intangible harms
thus fit a larger trend in substantive cyberlaw doctrine.
223 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2013); see Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003);
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
224 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2013).
225 See, e.g., Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 103–05 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing
contributory trademark infringement).
226 See Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2117 (2014).
227 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2013) (noting that it is U.S. policy “to promote the contin-
ued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other inter-
active media”); Mark Lemley, David S. Levine, & David G. Post, Don’t Break the Internet, 64
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 34, 34–38 (2011) (discussing the potential chilling effects of the
Protect IP Act of 2011 and the Stop Online Piracy Act).
228 See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2025, 2055 (2014) (“Section
230 has been critical to the development of a thriving Internet ecosystem based largely on
content supplied by users.”); Eric Goldman, The Regulation of Reputational Information, in
THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 293–99 (Berin Szoka &
Adam Marcus, eds., 2010); Eric Goldman, Unregulating Online Harassment, 87 DENV. U. L.
REV. ONLINE 59, 60 (2010) (arguing that section 230 facilitates innovation in the creation
of user-generated content).
229 Indeed, from a utilitarian perspective, holding intermediaries accountable for un-
lawful conduct is likely to be far more efficient and effective in curtailing that illegal activity
than targeting first parties. See Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Prov-
iders Accountable, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 221, 222–40 (2006); Ronald J. Mann & Seth R.
Belzley, The Promise of Internet Intermediary Liability, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 239, 243–75
(2005); see also Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First
Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986, 1002–15 (2008); Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship
and the Limits of Intermediary Immunity, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293, 298–304 (2011).
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Moreover, the practical justifications for expanded jurisdiction in
cases of physical interests and harms fit poorly, if it all, in the Internet
context of intangible considerations.  Unlike physical damage, harms
to intangible interests rarely call nonjudicial government resources
into action.  Exploding automobiles implicate fire and police depart-
ments; faulty cutting machines draw in EMS and hospital personnel.
There is no government entity to call for relief from patent infringe-
ment or defamation.  And, when physical harm has occurred, relevant
evidence is likely to be located in the place where the plaintiff exper-
ienced that harm.  Online, though, evidence of the harm or violation
is also digital.  Its location can be arbitrary, often having little or no
connection to where the plaintiff is physically located, and the cost
advantages of siting lawsuits near the plaintiff are, consequently,
minimal.
Finally, Internet users may benefit from the reduced costs that
flow from a narrow jurisdictional approach because they may be as
likely to be sued as to sue.  Firms, in particular, can expect that they
will both prosecute and defend IP claims over time.  From an ex ante
perspective, there is no cost-based reason to favor rules preferring
plaintiffs rather than defendants.230 For example, the sandwich chain
Subway sued competitor Quiznos on trademark and false advertising
grounds after Quiznos ran a Web-based contest for user videos poking
fun at Subway’s food.231  Later, though, Subway found itself on the
wrong end of a false advertising suit, after consumers challenged the
veracity of its claims to sell a “footlong” sandwich.232  (The consumers’
sandwiches came up short.)233  Similarly, rapper Jay-Z is both a victim
of copyright infringement online234 and, allegedly, an infringer him-
self.235  While this possibility of trading places will not apply to every
Internet user, if it is generally the case that a user faces the possibility
230 In many situations, the Due Process Clauses, of course, provide the tie-breaking
rule that favors defendants.
231 See Doctor’s Assocs. v. QIP Holder LLC, No. 3:06-cv-1710(VLB), 2010 WL 669870,
at *15–25 (D. Conn. Feb. 19, 2010) (setting out causes of action under Lanham Act and
Connecticut law); Louise Story, Subway Sues Quiznos Over User-Made Ads, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
28, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/28/technology/28iht-adco.4.9555321.html.
232 See Kristene Quan, Size Matters: Customers Sue Subway After “Footlong” Sandwich Fails to
Measure Up, TIME (Jan. 25, 2013), http://newsfeed.time.com/2013/01/25/size-matters-
customers-sue-subway-after-footlong-sandwich-fails-to-measure-up/.
233 See In re Subway Footlong Sandwich Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 949 F. Supp. 2d
1369, 1370 (J.P.M.L. 2013).
234 See Jess Collen, Getting Jay Z’s New Album, Copyrights Be Damned, FORBES (July 22,
2013, 1:58 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jesscollen/2013/07/22/getting-jay-zs-new-
album-copyrights-be-damned/ (describing illegal downloading of Jay-Z’s album “Magna
Carta Holy Grail”).
235 See Eriq Gardner, Jay Z Faces Sound Engineer’s Bold Claim Over Song Rights,
HOLLYWOOD REP. (July 9, 2014, 8:18 AM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/
jay-z-faces-sound-engineers-717385.
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of being either a plaintiff or a defendant, then society may prefer,
from behind the veil of ignorance, a system that reduces overall costs
rather than one that favors a particular side.236
There are several ways that courts could implement this narrow
approach.  Most obviously, if the Supreme Court embraces the notion
that most restrictions on personal jurisdiction are subconstitutional, it
could simply announce a new prudential rule—a sort of Nicastro for
the Net.  The Court could go further and overrule Calder, which long
has been the subject of intense scholarly criticism.237  This route
would have the advantage of being the most candid and workable way
to achieve the narrow approach to intangible harm.  It would concede
that the current tests for physical contacts are simply decision rules,
giving concrete guidance to courts that confront traditional harms.
Without overturning any of those precedents, the Court could admit
that a different decision rule is desirable in guiding an analysis of in-
tangible activity and harm.
Even if the Court rejects the tripartite formulation of personal
jurisdiction’s deep structure, it could still fit the rule that we propose
into the current doctrinal framework.  One possibility is that the
Supreme Court could declare that virtual activity does not create a
meaningful “contact” with any particular forum.  Lower courts can
largely do the same thing by rationalizing the rules that currently gov-
ern Internet cases.  For some circuits, this would necessitate discard-
ing existing approaches—for example, it would mean retiring Zippo.
Other circuits could readily fit this scheme under their extant tests,
which often require “something more” than Internet activity.
Another possibility is that courts could incorporate the narrow
approach to intangible harm into the analysis of whether jurisdiction
is reasonable.  At present, the reasonableness calculus is a pragmatic
backstop to personal jurisdiction: even if jurisdiction over the defen-
dant is proper, the court may decline to exercise that jurisdiction if it
sees exercising authority as inefficient or undesirable.238  The burden
of demonstrating unreasonableness falls on the defendant.  Courts
could treat the issues that we raise about personal jurisdiction via In-
ternet contacts as meeting that burden, making jurisdiction
unreasonable.
236 See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999).
237 See, e.g., Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Of Nodes and Power Laws: A Network Theory Approach
to Internet Jurisdiction Through Data Privacy, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 493, 517 (2004); Robertson,
supra note 59, at 1309–26; see also Howard B. Stravitz, Sayonara to Minimum Contacts: Asahi R
Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 39 S.C. L. REV. 729, 771 (1988) (“The Court ap-
peared to reach hard to justify jurisdiction in . . . Calder.”).
238 See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113–16 (1987); see
also Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction,
65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 764–65 (1987).
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Couching these doctrinal tweaks in the Court’s current constitu-
tional language of “contacts,” “purposefulness,” and “reasonableness”
may appeal to courts and scholars who view personal jurisdiction pri-
marily in constitutional terms.  From our perspective, this is only a
second-best solution that would still lead to certain awkwardness.
Courts would continue to indulge the fiction that intangible activity
necessarily has tangible results, or they would risk creating a different
standard of reasonableness for tangible and intangible harms.  But
any uneasiness in logic would be forgivable.  The end result would be
more predictable and efficient and thus would be superior to current
approaches.
Finally, Congress could act legislatively to alter the jurisdictional
balance.  It has been attentive to jurisdictional concerns of late, partic-
ularly in intellectual property.  For example, in the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act of 1999, Congress authorized expanded in
rem jurisdiction over domain names if plaintiffs could not obtain in
personam jurisdiction over defendants.239  Thus, even if the court
could lacked jurisdiction over a defendant who owned a
trademark-infringing domain name, the plaintiff could more easily lit-
igate against the domain name itself.240  Similarly, when Congress
passed patent reform legislation via the America Invents Act, it altered
appellate jurisdiction when patent issues arise via the defendant’s
counterclaims in its answer, rather than via the plaintiff’s claims in its
complaint.241  Previously, the Supreme Court had followed the vener-
able well-pleaded complaint rule, holding that the Federal Circuit had
appellate jurisdiction for claims of patent infringement, but that the
circuit courts of appeal had appellate jurisdiction for counter-
claims.242  Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982 to unify the
increasingly divergent patent precedent generated by the regional cir-
cuit courts of appeals;243 the Court’s ruling placed that goal at risk.
So, the America Invents Act changed the rule.
Thus, Congress is well positioned to reassess the jurisdictional
rules for Internet-based cases.  Under the tripartite formulation of
personal jurisdiction’s deep structure, Congress has almost unfettered
latitude to revise the doctrine, which in nearly every instance is
239 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) (2013).
240 See, e.g., Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsche.net, 302 F.3d 248, 254 (4th Cir. 2002)
(“The anticybersquatting statute authorizes in rem jurisdiction over a domain name if per-
sonal jurisdiction over the registrant of the domain name is unavailable.”).
241 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, § 19(b), 125 Stat. 284,
331 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2011)).
242 See Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 832–33
(2002).
243 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97–164, § 127, 96 Stat. 25, 37
(1982).
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procedural common law subject to legislative tweaking.244  But even if
courts continue to view the doctrinal architecture as constitutionally
compelled, Congress still has latitude to place further limitations on
courts’ adjudicative authority.  What it may not do, under the tradi-
tional view of personal jurisdiction, is expand jurisdiction beyond the
limits articulated by the Supreme Court.  Consequently, under either
view, Congress may impose the narrow approach to intangible harm
that we propose here.
C. Test Cases
We can measure this Article’s proposal for the problems of the
Internet and personal jurisdiction against three hard test cases involv-
ing contracts, trademarks, and computer network attacks (hacking).
A brief word, though, is in order about what our proposal does not
change.
Although the narrow approach that we advocate calls for courts
to abandon the fiction that virtual activity is akin to physical contact
with one or more states, many cases feature a combination of virtual
and physical contact.  Many lower courts already recognize that In-
ternet activity, by itself, is ambiguous for purposes of determining the
propriety of personal jurisdiction.  Thus, they already take account of
non-Internet, physical contacts.245  Our approach, while discounting
the Internet activity entirely, leaves undisturbed the rest of the juris-
dictional analysis that many courts already undertake in these “mixed”
cases.
Accordingly, our proposal should not change how courts ap-
proach cases involving direct and indirect sales.  In the case of direct
sales from a defendant to a plaintiff, the relevant contact is the defen-
dant’s physical delivery of a good to a particular forum.  Thus, when a
transaction occurs between an online site and a user, and the claim is
founded on that transaction, the situation is no different than in phys-
ical space; specific jurisdiction is undoubtedly appropriate where the
defendant sent the product.  To the extent that Justice Breyer worried
about the Appalachian potter who might be exposed to jurisdiction
throughout the country,246 the concern is easily allayed.  A seller has
ample opportunity to engage in self-help through forum selection
clauses, which federal courts presumptively enforce.247  Thus, the Ap-
palachian potter can include a clause in the sales contracts—with
244 See Weinstein, supra note 142, at 187. R
245 See, e.g., Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 453 (3d Cir. 2003) (iden-
tifying non-Internet contacts, including attendance at trade shows and use of vendors in
forum, as relevant to jurisdictional calculus).
246 See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2793 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
247 See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 590–95 (1991).
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purchasers in Alaska, California, and Vermont—that direct all litiga-
tion to Kentucky.
A slightly more complicated case involves indirect sales through
the Internet—say, via an independent distributor or via a consign-
ment operation like Amazon.  Here, too, the goods are tangible, even
if the communication medium is virtual.  And here again there is no
call to rewrite offline rules for the online world.  Courts and scholars
have challenged whether the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this
area—the so-called “stream of commerce” cases—functions well.248
This is a classic situation, though, in which any doctrinal deficiencies
are common to both the online and offline worlds.  If anything, the
Internet cases simply expose a broader problem with the Court’s
stream of commerce jurisprudence.
Hard cases, however, remain.  In three test cases, the narrow ap-
proach best promotes fairness and predictability.
1. Contracts
The first hard test case involves online contracts.  Consider a user
in Phoenix who signs up for a new social networking service with
headquarters in Brooklyn.  The site’s terms of service, which all users
must accept as a condition of access, do not specify venue or choice of
law.  The terms do, however, promise that the site will not share the
user’s data with any other company.  And the site collects basic demo-
graphic information sufficient to enable it to know where the user
resides in real space.  Eager to raise capital, the site—in contravention
of the terms of service—sells user data to a third party.  When the user
learns of this breach, may she sue the site in Arizona?  Does that an-
swer change if the site does not collect information enabling it to de-
termine users’ residency?  The narrow approach would allow
jurisdiction in New York but not Arizona, and such a result appears to
yield the greatest efficiency.
Internet-based contracts are largely contracts of adhesion: terms
of service, e-commerce agreements, and the like contain standardized
terms, and bespoke provisions are difficult if not impossible to negoti-
ate.249  However, the Net also offers choice—consumers have many
options, and sites compete for traffic.250  Generally, online contracts
248 See, e.g., Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2794–2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Robin J. Effron,
Letting the Perfect Become the Enemy of the Good: The Relatedness Problem in Personal Jurisdiction,
16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 867, 893–94 (2012).
249 See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Elec-
tronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 467–69 (2002). But see Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhe-
sion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1230–45 (1983) (contending that
form terms contained in contracts of adhesion should be presumptively unenforceable).
250 See Derek E. Bambauer, Middlemen, 65 FLA. L. REV. F. 1, 2 (2013).
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mirror offline ones in what buyers prioritize.251  While some users join
or leave sites and services based on nonpecuniary factors such as pri-
vacy policies, most focus solely on price.252  This means that buyers
and sellers are capable of bargaining to an efficient outcome, but it
also means that nonprice terms likely reflect sellers’ preferences.253
If these conclusions are correct, then sellers can easily protect
themselves from unfavorable jurisdictional rules through choice of fo-
rum provisions in contracts.  Thus, the goal of a strong default rule—
to approximate what the parties would bargain for, thereby saving
them the transaction costs of negotiation—is best met with the narrow
jurisdictional approach.254  Sellers will want to minimize the number
of forum states where they can be sued and will craft terms that limit
jurisdiction for claims arising out of the contract.
The narrow approach arrives at the same end without the cost.
The broader jurisdictional scheme, which buyers might prefer (since
it could allow them to sue in their home states), faces contractual
override by sophisticated sellers, who simply can draft appropriate
provisions at (relatively) minor cost.  Buyers, then, only obtain the
benefit of more fora in which to sue if they are litigating against unso-
phisticated sellers or if courts disregard forum selection clauses.255
Sellers able to predict the risk of being haled into multiple forum
states, and who believe they could not offset this risk contractually,
would likely set aside resources or obtain insurance against those ad-
ded costs, increasing prices.  Again, buyers generally prefer low price
over other favorable contractual terms.256
251 See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 249, at 485–86. R
252 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.8, at 116 (6th ed. 2003).
253 To expand upon the logic: if sellers prefer Term A and buyers prefer Term B,
presumably sellers will have to be compensated to offer Term B.  But, since buyers care
principally about price, they favor a lower price with Term A to a higher one with Term B.
In effect, sellers compensate buyers to accept Term A.
254 See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General
Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 971 (1983) (“Ideally, the preformulated
rules supplied by the state should mimic the agreements contracting parties would reach
were they costlessly to bargain out each detail of the transaction.”); Alan Schwartz &
Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 596 (2003)
(“[I]t does for parties what they would have done for themselves had their contracting
costs been lower.”).
255 See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 590–95 (1991) (creating pre-
sumption that forum selection clauses designating a reasonable forum are valid); cf. J. Mc-
Intyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2793 (2011) (Breyer, J. concurring)
(expressing concern about effects of the jurisdictional rule on small manufacturers such as
an Appalachian potter).
256 It is possible that this buyer-seller account is incomplete—that there are externali-
ties or broader societal considerations that it fails to consider. See Ian Ayres, Regulating
Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032, 2090 (2012).  However,
those issues generally arise in other contexts, such as tort, antitrust, or unfair competition,
rather than within contract doctrine itself, and reviewing courts can disregard jurisdic-
tional terms when those other considerations are at stake.  See, e.g., Dix v. ICT Grp., Inc.,
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Accordingly, we conclude that the narrow approach is optimal for
the contracts test case.  The disgruntled dating service user described
above could not sue in her home state of Arizona, regardless of
whether the site collected information about her state of residence.
Even without a choice of forum provision, the courts, under our ap-
proach, would evaluate personal jurisdiction narrowly.  Put differ-
ently, personal jurisdiction has the effect of operating like an implied
contractual term—in this case, an implied choice of forum term that
channels all litigation to New York.
2. Trademarks
Second, imagine an entrepreneur who opens a donut shop,
called Cactus Donuts, in Kingman, Arizona.  Since the new business is
near the Nevada border, the shop owner advertises in local newspa-
pers in Las Vegas, gaining minor recognition.  Sometime later, a sec-
ond donut aficionado opens a shop, also called Cactus Donuts, in
Nipton, California—also near the Nevada border.  The California
owner launches a Web site heavily promoted via Google Ads and so-
cial media.  Many Nevada residents visit the Cactus Donuts (Califor-
nia) site.  Finally, the Arizona owner opens a second Cactus Donuts
shop in Las Vegas, but is consternated to learn that most customers
think it is an offshoot of the California one.  The Arizona owner deter-
mines to sue her counterpart for trademark infringement.257  Can she
obtain personal jurisdiction in Arizona?  What about Nevada?
Trademarks present a difficult puzzle for personal jurisdiction be-
cause the harms involved are doubly intangible.  First, trademarks pro-
tect particular bits of information because of their cognitive effects on
consumers.258  The dominant theoretical rationale for trademark law
is that it reduces search costs.259  For example, rather than examining
each pair of shoes carefully to determine their quality, consumers can
simply look for the word “Nike” on the box or the famous swoosh on
the side of the sneaker.  Trademark doctrine thus protects an
161 P.3d 1016, 1024–25 (Wash. 2007) (“If a forum selection clause precludes class actions
and thereby significantly impairs Washington citizens’ ability to seek relief . . . the clause
violates the public policy underlying [Washington’s Consumer Protection Act] . . . .”).
257 In trademark law, for unregistered marks, senior users (those first in time) enjoy
superior rights to junior users (those later in time) everywhere that they use their marks in
commerce, including in geographic locations where their reputation has spread. See, e.g.,
Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1193–1203 (11th Cir. 2001)
(discussing priority under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), which covers unregistered marks); United
Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97–102 (1918) (discussing geographic
limits on rights in unregistered marks).
258 See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1839, 1844 (2007).
259 See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on
the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 786–88 (2004).
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intangible good—a brand or logo—because of an intangible effect.
Over time, trademark doctrine has become even more intangible and
borderless.  Courts have expanded trademark protection to cover situ-
ations other than purchases, further attenuating the psychological
role of marks.260  Marks are protected even in jurisdictions where the
particular goods or services are not available, on the theory that their
reputation is present in those states and subject to damage.261  And
theories of liability such as dilution unmoor trademark from classic
harms such as passing off, relying instead on the concept that dilutive
marks reduce the unique conjuring power of famous marks in con-
sumers’ minds—even if consumers are not confused in the slightest
about the source of the product or service.262
Second, any harm to the mark because of Internet activity, such
as advertising, is intangible.  If courts treat the mark as having a physi-
cal location (and the harm as occurring there), it means that jurisdic-
tion travels with the trademark.  The moment that there is a
reputation to be harmed in a given state, jurisdiction is proper.  This
has curious resonance with pre-Zippo Internet decisions finding juris-
diction in every state due to online presence.263  Trademark, in short,
runs the greatest risk of sliding down the slippery slope of online juris-
diction to de facto unlimited jurisdiction throughout the United
States.
Our solution bifurcates tangible harms, such as the sale of goods
bearing an infringing mark, and intangible ones, such as use of an
infringing mark on an Internet site.  For tangible harms, the physical-
ity rule applies: the mark owner can sue in the states where the sales
occurred, as well as in the defendant’s domicile state.  For intangible
harms, though, the mark owner must sue the defendant in the defen-
dant’s home state.
260 See, e.g., Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, 423 F.3d 539, 549–52 (6th
Cir. 2005) (initial interest confusion); Ferrari S.P.A. v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1244–45
(6th Cir. 1991) (post-sale confusion).
261 See, e.g., Nestle Prepared Foods Co. v. Pocket Foods Corp., No. 04-cv-02533-MSK-
MEH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76213, at *29–32 (D. Colo. Apr. 5, 2007) (holding that Pocket
Foods infringed Nestle’s trademark even though Pocket Foods had not made any sales in
Colorado).
262 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2013); Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208,
228–29 (2d Cir. 1999); Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40
HARV. L. REV. 813, 831–32 (1927).
263 It also corresponds with how trademark doctrine treats infringement of registered
marks, which enjoy presumptive nationwide priority and which can obtain injunctive relief
upon entry into a relevant geographic market. Compare Nestle Prepared Foods Co., 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 26181, at *14–16 (holding personal jurisdiction over Pocket Foods reasonable
in granting injunction because Pocket Foods had entered into distribution agreement with
Colorado firm), with Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 365 (2d
Cir. 1959) (denying injunctive relief where there was no likelihood that a distributor of
baked goods “will expand its use of [its registered] mark at the retail level into defendant’s
trading area”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-5\CRN503.txt unknown Seq: 50 12-JUN-15 11:15
1178 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:1129
For the trademark case above, the Arizona Cactus Donuts owner
would have to sue its California doppelganger in California’s courts.
The alternative broad approach to trademark presence and harm
runs too greatly counter to fairness and predictability—a defendant
would be exposed to jurisdiction everywhere in the country and would
have no self-help mechanisms to avoid jurisdiction in any given place.
3. Hacking
Finally, assume that a Brooklyn user of an online dating service,
angry with his lack of relationship success, launches a computer net-
work attack against the site.  The attack overwhelms the site’s servers
with traffic, driving it offline, and the downtime costs the dating ser-
vice tens of thousands of dollars.  The servers are located in Virginia
and California, while the service itself operates out of Atlanta, Geor-
gia.  The jilted user does not know where any of the physical plants
are located, nor does he care.  Once the service discovers his identity,
can it sue him in Virginia, California, or Georgia?264
Of the three hard test cases, hacking presents the greatest conun-
drum for personal jurisdiction analysis.  Computer network attacks
can generate physical effects, intangible effects, or both.  For physical
effects, consider a hack that causes a generator to overheat, or that
shuts down an air traffic control system, potentially causing inbound
aircraft to crash.265  For intangible effects, there have been attacks
that copied trade secrets or classified information, or that defaced
Web sites.266  For both physical and intangible, the cyberweapon
Stuxnet serves as a telling example: it both caused Iran’s uranium en-
richment centrifuges to spin too fast and wear out, and it also
264 The suit would presumably be under the civil provisions of the federal Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act or similar state law provisions. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2013); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 502(e)(1) (West 2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-93(g) (2010); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-152.12(A) (2010).
265 See, e.g., Bambauer, supra note 139, at 1015–19 (describing how Stuxnet worm dam- R
aged Iran’s uranium enrichment plant); David Kushner, The Real Story of Stuxnet, IEEE
SPECTRUM (Feb. 26, 2013, 2:00 PM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-real-
story-of-stuxnet (same); David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against
Iran, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2012, at A1 (discussing how President Obama “secretly ordered
increasingly sophisticated attacks on the computer systems that run Iran’s main nuclear
enrichment facilities”); see also Paul Festa, DOJ Charges Youth in Hack Attacks, CNET (Mar.
18, 1998, 4:50 PM), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-209260.html. (describing how a juve-
nile’s computer hack disabled an airport control tower); Jeanne Meserve, Sources: Staged
Cyber Attack Reveals Vulnerability in Power Grid, CNN (Sept. 26, 2007, 11:06 PM), http://
www.cnn.com/2007/US/09/26/power.at.risk/ (detailing an experimental controlled hack
that “changed the operating cycle of [a] generator, sending it out of control”).
266 See Siobhan Gorman et al., Computer Spies Breach Fighter-Jet Project, WALL ST. J., Apr.
21, 2009, at A1; Violet Blue, MIT Website Hacked by Anonymous on Anniversary of Aaron Swartz
Suicide, ZDNET (Jan. 11, 2014, 1:09 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/mit-website-hacked-by-
anonymous-on-anniversary-of-aaron-swartz-suicide/.
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transmitted false information to the engineers at the Natanz enrich-
ment complex.267
For hacks with physical effects, standard physicality analysis for
personal jurisdiction should apply.  Such attacks are real, but they are
the exception rather than the rule.268  Conceptually, this type of net-
work attack is similar to mailing a bomb to a given location: it causes
tangible harm, likely calls forum-state resources into action, and is ge-
ographically predictable by the perpetrator.269  An attacker stealing
data does not care, and probably does not know, where the computer
storing the information resides.270  An attacker seeking to overload a
generator likely has a solid idea of where it is located.  So, for hacking
that causes physical damage, our approach is rooted in physicality ju-
risprudence.  Courts, though, must resist formalistic thinking.  If a
hacker defaces a website hosted on a computer in Los Angeles, she
has changed the magnetic state of bits on the server’s hard drive.271
That should not count as physical effects, though, in the same way
that a gunshot across state lines should count.  Information is trans-
mitted via physical change—but that differs from physical harm.
For hacks with both physical and intangible effects, our approach
disambiguates: the defendant can be haled into court wherever physi-
cal harm occurs but can be sued for intangible effects only in her
domicile.272  In cases of intangible harms, from a predictability per-
spective, the defendant is indifferent to the location of the targeted
computer.  Moreover, much depends on the plaintiff’s choice of tech-
nology.  If the plaintiff hosts information on his own server, in his
state of residence, it may be possible (albeit unlikely) for the defen-
dant to ascertain where she might be subject to jurisdiction by using
geolocation or other technological self-help.  But if the plaintiff uses
cloud computing (such as Amazon’s EC2), or mirrors the site via
services such as Akamai, the defendant has little, if any, ability to
267 See Bambauer, supra note 170, at 585–86. R
268 See id. at 616–18 (“[A]vailable data suggest that [physical-attack] risks have been
considerably overstated.”).
269 See Rose Pastore, How An Elite Nerd Squad Dismantled the Unabomber’s Last Deadly De-
vice, POPULAR SCI. (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2013-01/
how-elite-bomb-squad-dismantled-unabombers-last-deadly-device (describing disarming of
Unabomber Theodore Kaczynski’s last mail bomb).
270 See Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, supra note 139, at 1014 (discussing how R
GhostNet spy software captured secret documents for their political value, regardless of the
computers’ various physical locations).
271 Cf. United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 452–55 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (prosecution for
hoax involving falsified MySpace profile created on servers in Los Angeles by Missouri
defendants).
272 This Article deals only with personal jurisdiction in civil suits; venue for criminal
trials is a distinct issue. See 2 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FED. PRAC. & PROC. CRIM. § 301
(4th ed. 2010); 14D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 3801 (3d ed.
2010).
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predict where the plaintiff will bring suit.273  Cloud computing may
distribute different parts of content across different servers—a process
Google calls “sharding”—or may vary how it responds to requests for
information, from whichever server it thinks is most available or clos-
est in networking terms.274  It is counterintuitive, if not completely
arbitrary, to allow personal jurisdiction analysis to turn on the plain-
tiff’s choice of computer storage.
Moreover, hacking may not even involve physical changes to a
computer system.  Consider trade secret theft.  The attacker may use
purloined credentials to access the system and files, and then copy the
data.275  This does not flip the bits on the target system—no data was
harmed in the making of this copy—but of course causes real harm to
the trade secret owner: the information is in the wild.276  The copying
does cause the target computer to react physically, as its hard drive
spins and information is copied into and out of memory, but these
physical effects are not the harm at issue.277
In the hacking hypothetical above, the defendant would be ame-
nable to suit in New York.  She is suable in New York because she lives
there.  Jurisdiction in California, Georgia, or Virginia is not proper,
though, because the defendant has little ability to predict the effects
of the denial of service attack on systems there, and there is no reason
to think it fair to allow the plaintiff to dictate jurisdiction based on the
siting of its information technology systems.  Hackers are playing with
real fire, though—if a malware attack (instead of a DoS one) caused
physical damage to the computers in California or Georgia, they
would be subject to jurisdiction there.  In our view, that is the appro-
priate allocation of risk for personal jurisdiction purposes.278
273 See generally John Dilley et al., Globally Distributed Content Delivery, IEEE INTERNET
COMPUTING 51 (Sept./Oct. 2002), available at http:/www.akamai.com/dl/technical_publi
cations/GloballyDistributedContentDelivery.pdf (describing how mirroring “deploy[s]
clusters in a few locations”); Global Infrastructure, AMAZON WEB SERVICES, http://
aws.amazon.com/ec2/ (last visited May 12, 2015) (explaining the EC2 web service).
274 See Derek E. Bambauer, Schro¨dinger’s Cybersecurity, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 791, 814
(2015).
275 See, e.g., Inquiry Mgmt. Sys., Ltd. v. Berkshire Info. Sys., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 521,
523 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (advertising-tracking service provider allegedly obtained user identifi-
cation and password to gain access to rival company’s data).
276 See, e.g., Diamond Power Int’l, Inc. v. Davidson, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1326–27
(N.D. Ga. 2007) (former manager of plaintiff’s service operations allegedly misappropri-
ated trade secrets for the benefit of a competitor).
277 Small-scale physical effects, such as use of a target computer’s RAM or network
bandwidth, have generally not been found to generate liability. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v.
Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 303–04 (Cal. 2003). But see Cyber Promotions Inc. v. Am. Online,
Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 456 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (“Cyber simply does not have the unfettered
right . . . to invade AOL’s private property with mass e-mail advertisements.”).
278 It is particularly important that courts not conflate statutory regimes treating intan-
gible effects, such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, with physical tort schemes
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D. Potential Objections
1. Will Restricting the Places Where Plaintiffs Can Bring Lawsuits
Make Litigation Less Efficient?
From a practical perspective, the restriction that we propose—
limiting the places where personal jurisdiction is available for purely
intangible harms—could lead to litigation inefficiencies.  Return for a
moment to the final test case involving hacking.  If someone located
in New York hacks into, say, a Virginia defense contractor’s computer
system, the hacker can cause both physical harm (say, shutting down
the air conditioning and thereby destroying expensive equipment)
and intangible harm (for example, data intrusion and theft).  Under
the broad approach to personal jurisdiction, the Virginia plaintiff
could bring all of the claims in Virginia.279  Under our narrow ap-
proach, the plaintiff faces an initial choice that might seem unpalat-
able and inefficient: (1) divide the claims (by bringing the claims for
physical harm in Virginia and those for intangible harms in New
York); or (2) bring all claims in New York where the defendant is ame-
nable to general jurisdiction.  The first option fails to capture the effi-
ciency of deciding related claims together.280  The second option
locates the case in New York, potentially far away from the evidence
that pertains to the physical harm suffered by the Virginia plaintiff.
Neither seems satisfactory on first read.
Despite the initial appearance of inefficiency and rigidity in this
context, for several reasons, our proposal in fact offers the exact oppo-
site qualities.
First, it creates a clear rule about where a lawsuit should begin.
When the harm is intangible, the plaintiff knows he must start on the
defendant’s home turf.  Second, as discussed more fully below, courts
have safety valves at their disposal—transfer of venue and consolida-
tion under multidistrict litigation—that can ameliorate major ineffi-
ciencies.  Third, while those safety valves might relocate certain
lawsuits away from the initial forum, they operate much more effi-
ciently than current personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.  Right now, a
plaintiff can seek out any number of potential forums.  As long as she
can show that the defendant has minimum contacts with a given place,
regulating tangible effects, such as trespass.  Mistaken analogies between the two risk send-
ing courts down the virtual rabbit hole for personal jurisdiction purposes.
279 Although a plaintiff “must secure personal jurisdiction over a defendant with re-
spect to each claim she asserts,” courts typically allow a plaintiff to invoke “pendent per-
sonal jurisdiction” over the defendant with respect to all transactionally related claims.  4A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 1069.7 (3d ed. 2010).
280 See Alan M. Trammell, Transactionalism Costs, 100 VA. L. REV. 1211, 1217–19,
1223–24 (2014) (noting the longstanding presumption that courts should resolve logically
related claims together).
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that forum becomes available.281  Satellite litigation often develops
around personal jurisdiction questions, complete with full hearings
and rights of appeal.  By contrast, transferring a case is relatively lim-
ited and straightforward.  The burden is on the party seeking transfer
to demonstrate that the alternative forum is not just viable, but nota-
bly superior to the initial forum.282  Moreover, the judge, not the
party seeking transfer, ultimately assesses society’s interests in effi-
ciency when making that determination.283  And once the judge de-
cides to transfer the case (or not), that is the end.  No satellite
litigation develops because venue is a matter of convenience and legis-
lative grace; unlike personal jurisdiction, it is not imbued with consti-
tutional significance.284
From an ex ante perspective, when the harm is physical, the place
of harm likely offers the most efficient place to sue.285  For example,
the evidence and relevant witnesses will often be there.  But when the
harm is intangible, there is no ex ante reason to believe that any fo-
rum presumptively offers a more desirable or socially efficient loca-
tion.  In any particular case, one forum might be clearly superior.
(The example above demonstrates such a situation—when related
claims most logically will be tried in a different forum.)  Without a way
to predict where the best forum will be, there are good reasons, from
an efficiency perspective, to create a clear starting point for the litiga-
tion and then empower judges to adapt to a case’s vagaries in some
circumstances.
The narrow approach to personal jurisdiction for intangible
harms creates that clear starting point.  A plaintiff can obtain personal
jurisdiction in only a limited number of places—where a defendant is
281 See McMunigal, supra note 42, at 193–99. R
282 See, e.g., Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Chimet, S.P.A., 619 F.3d 288, 295 (3d Cir. 2010);
Filmline (Cross-Country) Prods., Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 865 F.2d 513, 521 (2d Cir.
1989); Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 514, 522
(D. Mass. 2012).
283 See, e.g., Jarvis Christian Coll. v. Exxon Corp., 845 F.2d 523, 529 (5th Cir. 1988);
Jones v. Smith, 784 F.2d 149, 151 (2d Cir. 1986).
284 See, e.g., Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979) ([V]enue . . . is
primarily a matter of choosing a convenient forum.”); Johnson Creative Arts, Inc. v. Wool
Masters, Inc., 743 F.2d 947, 951 (1st Cir. 1984) (“Venue . . . is based on Congress’ decision
concerning where a case should be heard.  It is a privilege given to the defendant primarily
as a matter of convenience and is not based on an inherent power of a particular court
over the parties.”).
285 This approach is deeply ingrained in European approaches to personal jurisdic-
tion.  In the United States, however, it is sometimes difficult to effectuate. See Borchers,
supra note 158, at 130–32.  If a plaintiff suffers harm in the forum but cannot prove that R
the defendant purposefully affiliated with the forum, personal jurisdiction is lacking. See,
e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787–90 (2011) (plurality opin-
ion); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
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subject to general jurisdiction.286  This presumption promotes clarity
and predictability for both plaintiffs and defendants, and it avoids sat-
ellite litigation about where else a defendant is subject to jurisdiction.
Accordingly, it focuses the parties’ and the courts’ resources on the
case’s merits rather than threshold issues.
What, then, are the mechanics of dealing with inevitable ineffi-
ciency?  If the presumptive starting point is problematic, courts and
litigants already have tools to ameliorate the problem.  Our proposal
likely creates an incentive for plaintiffs to bring their cases in federal
courts, which often have more flexibility than state courts to relocate
cases.  Channeling cases to federal courts creates several advantages.
First, federal courts, unlike state courts, can transfer cases across
state lines.287  In the example above, if the Virginia defense contractor
brings its claim for intangible harm in New York state court, there is
no direct mechanism by which the state court can address the prob-
lem.288  Under our approach, if the plaintiff believes that Virginia is
the appropriate forum, it should bring the claim for intangible harm
in New York federal court, where personal jurisdiction undoubtedly is
appropriate.  Because the defendant resides there, venue is also ap-
propriate.289  The plaintiff then can move to transfer venue to a fed-
eral court in Virginia.  In fact, such a scenario is precisely what the
venue statute envisions when it liberally authorizes federal courts to
transfer cases.290  Moreover, the venue statute already permits plaintiffs
to seek a transfer from the venue that they initially select.291
286 For an individual, this means the person’s domicile.  For a corporation, it means, in
all likelihood, the states where the defendant has incorporated or maintains its principal
place of business. See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text. R
287 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2013).
288 The indirect mechanisms for moving a case in this fashion are convoluted.  First,
the initial state court could grant a forum non conveniens dismissal, and the plaintiff could
refile the case in the alternative forum.  This approach is less than ideal because the bar for
granting a forum non conveniens dismissal is high. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l
Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430 (2007) (“A defendant invoking forum non conveniens
ordinarily bears a heavy burden in opposing the plaintiff’s chosen forum.”).  Moreover, a
dismissal is just that, meaning that a plaintiff could face a host of problems when trying to
refile, including potential statute of limitations problems. See Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349
U.S. 29, 32 (1955) (noting that forum non conveniens results in dismissal).  Second, the
defendant could remove the case to federal court, and then either party could seek a trans-
fer. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2013).  This effectively leads to the same result that we sug-
gest, but it adds the additional, unnecessary step of beginning in state court.
289 See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) (2013) (venue lies in “a judicial district in which any
defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is
located”).
290 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2013); see also 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FED. PRAC.
& PROC. § 3847 (3d ed. 2010) (discussing the standards governing transfer).
291 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(b) (2013); see also, e.g., Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516,
529 (1990) (“Section 1404(a) also exists for the benefit of the witnesses and the interest of
justice, which must include the convenience of the court.  Litigation in an inconvenient
forum does not harm the plaintiff alone.”).
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A potential wrinkle concerns the requirement that, absent the
parties’ consent, a court may transfer a case only to courts where
venue would have been appropriate initially.292  In our example,
would venue be appropriate in Virginia?  Under current jurispru-
dence, the answer is almost assuredly “yes.”  Venue lies in “a judicial
district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving
rise to the claim occurred.”293  Traditionally, this requirement has
been more demanding than the usual “minimum contacts” test for
personal jurisdiction.294 Our proposal to tighten the personal jurisdic-
tion standard could introduce a procedural oddity, making venue rel-
atively easy to establish in the place of harm (here, Virginia) even
though personal jurisdiction would not necessarily be appropriate.  If
our personal jurisdiction proposal were truly required by the Due
Processes Clauses of the Constitution, that would be problematic.  But
the narrow approach that we suggest is prophylactic in nature, a pru-
dential limitation that is subject to tweaking by Congress.295  Accord-
ingly, Congress could authorize transfer of venue to a court that,
under the narrow approach that we suggest, would not have personal
jurisdiction in the first instance.  Admittedly, this option—Congress’s
authorizing venue in a court that does not have personal jurisdic-
tion—is possible only if Congress adopts our proposal as part of the
federal long-arm statute or if the Supreme Court explicitly embraces it
as a prudential, common law limitation that is not constitutionally
compelled.296  Either way, the current transfer of venue provisions
could largely ameliorate the problem of cases winding up in mani-
festly inefficient locales.297
292 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (“[A] district court may transfer any civil action to any
other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to
which all parties have consented.”).
293 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).
294 See 4A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 279, § 3806 (noting that “[p]ersonal jurisdiction R
and venue simply are not the same thing” and that whereas personal jurisdiction requires
only “minimum” contacts, venue under section 1391(b)(2) requires that a “substantial”
part of the claim arise in the district).
295 See supra note 153 and accompanying text. R
296 Cf. supra note 150 and accompanying text.  This scenario would not work if the R
Supreme Court were to adopt our proposal as part of the constitutional test for personal
jurisdiction.
297 One might wonder whether this indulgence would give plaintiffs a way to circum-
vent our proposal.  It would not.  Imagine, for instance, that the Virginia plaintiff tries to
bring a lawsuit in the Eastern District of Virginia for intangible harms, arguing that venue
is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) (that is, where a substantial part of the events
or omissions occurred).  The New York defendant, under our proposal, could move for a
dismissal based on a lack of personal jurisdiction. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2).  By contrast,
if the plaintiff brings suit in New York, there can be no objection to personal jurisdiction.
But the New York federal court would still have discretion to transfer the case to Virginia,
where venue would lie.
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A second, more direct palliative is already available: multidistrict
litigation.  When cases that present common factual questions are
pending in different federal judicial districts, judges may consolidate
those cases for pretrial proceedings.298  This avenue is most appropri-
ate when many plaintiffs—say, numerous victims of a hacking attack—
file similar claims throughout the United States.  The multidistrict liti-
gation panel can group them together to avoid duplication of pretrial
proceedings, including pretrial conferences299 and discovery.300  Con-
solidation also would be appropriate if there are multiple defendants
whom the plaintiff must sue in multiple states.  If consolidation would
lead to efficiency gains—principally by coordinating discovery in re-
lated cases—the multidistrict litigation panel would transfer the cases
to one judge who would manage the pretrial phase of all of those
cases.301  If the cases proceed to trial, the managing judge remands
the cases to the courts where they originated.302  But hardly any cases
proceed to trial.303  The overwhelming majority are resolved through
dispositive motions or settlement before trial.304  If the concern is that
the narrow approach would lead to inefficient lawsuit structures, mul-
tidistrict litigation can avoid that problem in the lion’s share of cases
that do not ultimately proceed to trial.
Courts thus have two tools to mitigate inefficiency.  Both admit-
tedly involve an extra step—forcing plaintiffs to initiate lawsuits in one
place and then allowing courts to make necessary adjustments.  The
beauty of both solutions, though, is that they promote clarity at litiga-
tion’s inception and then empower courts to decide if a different law-
suit structure or location would be more efficient.  The latter point is
critical.  Whereas the broad approach to personal jurisdiction gives
298 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2013) (“When civil actions involving one or more common
questions of fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any
district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.  Such transfers shall be made
by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation authorized by this section . . . .”).
299 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)–(e) (scheduling conference), 26(f) (pretrial
conference).
300 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (scheduling conferences), 26–36 (various discovery
provisions).
301 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b).
302 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
303 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR ON
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. C-4 (2012) (showing that 1.2% of civil
cases filed in federal court went to trial); Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials
and the Thirty Years War, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1255–59 (2005) (noting a steady decline in
the percentage of trials in federal and state courts); see also Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation
Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1956 n.184 (2009) (noting that approximately
1% of federal civil cases terminate with trial); J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil
Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713, 1720 (2012) (noting that “federal civil trials . . . are now a
rarity”).
304 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim); FED.
R. CIV. P. 56 (motion for summary judgment).
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plaintiffs almost unfettered discretion to choose where to litigate a
claim—even in a demonstrably inefficient forum—our approach gives
a neutral magistrate the ability to realize litigation efficiencies.  Our
proposal provides clarity, takes away the plaintiff’s unilateral power to
impose inefficiency on the defendant and the system as a whole, and
retains flexibility.
2. Will the Narrow Approach Improperly Restrict Legitimate State
Regulatory Interests?
Our proposed approach might seem to risk artificially limiting a
state’s legitimate regulatory sphere.  In the defense contractor hypo-
thetical, if a hacker in New York purloins the data of a Virginia com-
pany, doesn’t the Commonwealth of Virginia have an interest in
regulating and punishing that conduct?  In a sense, this regulatory
interest implicates a societal fairness concern that our analysis thus far
has elided.
The first response to this concern is a narrow doctrinal one: the
scope of Virginia’s substantive regulatory power concerns
choice-of-law principles, not personal jurisdiction doctrine.  The Su-
preme Court has repeatedly emphasized that, although the two doc-
trines share much in common, they are conceptually distinct and
protect different interests.305  Accordingly, a New York court, which
has personal jurisdiction over one of its domiciliaries, might well apply
Virginia substantive law to a dispute that concerns conduct in
Virginia.
In theory, this is unproblematic and commonplace.  In practice,
though, courts tend to find that the substantive law of the state in
which they sit should govern.306  And the Supreme Court has placed
only the loosest restrictions on a court’s ability to choose a particular
305 See, e.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978) (“[W]hile the presence of
the children and one parent in California arguably might favor application of California
law in a lawsuit in New York, the fact that California may be the ‘center of gravity’ for
choice-of-law purposes does not mean that California has personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.”) (some internal quotation marks omitted); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,
215 (1977) (“[W]e have rejected the argument that if a State’s law can properly be applied
to a dispute, its courts necessarily have jurisdiction over the parties to that dispute.”); Han-
son v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958) (“The issue is personal jurisdiction, not choice of
law.”).
306 See Patrick J. Borchers, The Real Risk of Forum Shopping: A Dissent from Shady Grove,
44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29, 32 (2010) (noting the tendency of courts to apply forum law);
Michael Steven Green, Horizontal Erie and the Presumption of Forum Law, 109 MICH. L. REV.
1237, 1266–74 (2011) (noting various presumptions counseling application of forum law);
Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 801,
830–31 (2010) (noting the historical pedigree of the lex fori approach—calling for appli-
cation of forum law—to conflict of laws); Courtland H. Peterson, Proposals of Marriage Be-
tween Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 869, 871 (1981) (arguing that
modern choice-of-law theory encourages courts to apply forum law).
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body of substantive law.307  In this convoluted way, the restriction of
personal jurisdiction doctrine could also limit a state’s ability to en-
sure that its substantive law governs a dispute.
Our second response recognizes the way in which personal juris-
diction and choice-of-law doctrines interact, even though they are
technically distinct.  The Internet context (and the problem of intan-
gible harm generally) might exacerbate certain doctrinal difficulties,
but they do not cause that difficulty.  Thus, if our proposal brings the
uneasy relationship between personal jurisdiction and choice-of-law
into starker relief, it usefully exposes a deeper problem.
Scholars long have noted the anomaly in the Court’s current ap-
proaches to personal jurisdiction and choice-of-law.  For the former,
the standards are relatively rigorous, requiring that defendants have
purposefully directed activity at the forum state.  But a state’s substan-
tive law may govern a dispute as long as that state has even a tenuous
connection to the lawsuit.308  This leads to the odd result that even
when a state has sufficient regulatory interest in a dispute to supply
the substantive rules of decision, it might nonetheless lack power to
compel a defendant to appear in its courts.  If anything, this is back-
wards.309  Many scholars have argued that the two standards should
mirror each other more closely.310  Our proposal casts new light on an
old, festering problem.
There is a newer problem, though, that our proposal (and any
choice-of-law oddities to which it might lead) also exposes.  It is not
always intuitive which state should have the power to regulate conduct
on the Internet.  In the case involving the New York hacker, many
would probably assume that Virginia has a regulatory interest in pro-
tecting its citizens.  The strength of that intuition recedes when the
intangible harm seems less direct.  For instance, in the trademark test
case, should Arizona have the right to subject a California donut
307 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981) (plurality opinion); id. at
320–32 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Alan M. Trammell, Toil and
Trouble: How the Erie Doctrine Became Structurally Incoherent (and How Congress Can Fix It), 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 3249, 3275 (2014) (“[T]he Supreme Court has held that the Full Faith
and Credit Clause and the Due Process Clause impose only nominal constraints on a state’s
ability to apply its own substantive law to a dispute.”).
308 See Linda Silberman, Reflections on Burnham v. Superior Court: Toward Presumptive
Rules of Jurisdiction and Implications for Choice of Law, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 569, 585–87 (1991)
(noting that jurisdictional rules “function as the disguised regulator of choice-of-law
power”); Spencer, supra note 21, at 658-60. R
309 “To believe that a defendant’s contacts with the forum state should be stronger
under the due process clause for jurisdictional purposes than for choice of law is to believe
that an accused is more concerned with where he will be hanged than whether.”  Linda J.
Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 88 (1978).
310 See, e.g., id. at 87–89; Spencer, supra note 21, at 659–60; see also Silberman, supra R
note 308, at 587 (noting that divergent choice-of-law and personal jurisdiction principles R
can lead to forum shopping).
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shop—which has never done business in Arizona—to Arizona substan-
tive law?  Should Nevada or Vermont be able to do the same?  These
choice-of-law questions are difficult precisely because a similar prob-
lem underlies the current doctrine—courts resolve claims for intangi-
ble harm with rules tailored to the physical world.  Determining how
to navigate states’ competing regulatory interests is even more diffi-
cult than the questions with which we grapple in this Article.  Our
proposal simply makes more salient a bevy of hard questions plaguing
current doctrine.
3. Will the Narrow Approach Impede Plaintiffs’ Ability to Pursue
Defendants in Foreign Countries?
Our belief that the narrow approach offers a practical and effi-
cient solution is predicated on the idea that, in most instances, a
plaintiff who experiences intangible harm can easily bring a lawsuit
outside of her home state.  It might be marginally inconvenient for a
Nevadan to bring a claim in Vermont or North Carolina, but in most
situations the Nevadan will not encounter serious obstacles in finding
a lawyer, bringing her claim, conducting discovery, and obtaining and
enforcing a judgment.  There assuredly are procedural differences be-
tween the states but none that presumptively are an affront to Ameri-
can conceptions of due process.
But what if the defendant who has caused intangible harm is not
in another state but rather in a foreign country?  Surely, one might
argue, the challenges that a Nevadan faces in those circumstances
should merit greater consideration.  We agree.  For two reasons,
though, the difficulties presented by foreign defendants do not under-
mine the desirability of the narrow approach in the purely domestic
context.
First, from a realist perspective, there is the problem of enforce-
ment.  Imagine that an Iranian hacker causes intangible harm to the
Nevada plaintiff.  A broader approach to jurisdiction than the one
that we advocate would allow the Nevadan to gain jurisdiction over
the Iranian defendant in Nevada and bring the claim.  Suppose that
the plaintiff wins a judgment, what then?  She would have to enforce
the judgment somewhere, and unless the defendant has assets in the
United States, the plaintiff might be left exactly where she began: fac-
ing no reasonable prospect of recovery in the United States and being
dependent on the courts of a rogue state.  In other words, there is a
deeper problem on which our proposal has little, if any, effect.
The more difficult case is one involving, say, a German hacker.
An American plaintiff theoretically could bring a claim in Germany, a
country with an independent judiciary that would afford the plaintiff a
full and fair opportunity to pursue her claim against the defendant.
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The problem is not the unenforceability of the claim but, rather, the
extreme inconvenience of navigating a foreign judicial system.  In
fact, we do not suggest that the narrow approach to jurisdiction neces-
sarily should govern transnational cases.
The German example underscores the second, and probably far
more significant, response: our proposal is an attempt to treat jurisdic-
tional dilemmas at a subconstitutional level and thus need not be uni-
versally applicable.  Until now, courts that have perceived unfairness
and unpredictability within the broadest approaches to jurisdiction
have had to cabin courts’ exercise of judicial power in purely constitu-
tional terms.311  They have endeavored to argue that a Web site cre-
ated by someone in Vermont or Germany does not necessarily
establish relevant “contacts” with Nevada (absent certain other pur-
poseful affiliation with Nevada), such that Nevada courts have no con-
stitutional authority over those defendants.  Because those limitations
sound in constitutional theory, they necessarily have to apply to all
defendants.
The beauty of our approach is that because it is not cast in consti-
tutional terms, but rather operates on a prudential level, it can be
limited to a certain subset of cases.  A prudential limitation of this
nature can apply to purely domestic cases where the rule makes the
most sense.  We concede that a different prudential rule might be de-
sirable in transnational cases and might balance the competing con-
cerns in a different way.  This offers all the more reason to believe that
the Supreme Court should clarify which limits on personal jurisdic-
tion truly derive from a constitutional imperative and which ones are
prudential.  Only then can courts and legislatures disentangle the web
of incoherent rules and move toward a sensible, pragmatic jurisdic-
tional regime.
CONCLUSION
This Article opened with one puzzle: why the advent of the “In-
terwebs” so badly confounded courts’ personal jurisdiction analysis.
Our analysis of the problem uncovered a deeper, more profound co-
nundrum: why consideration of intangible interests and harms has
created such confusion in the doctrine.  The intellectual challenge
was not one of a technology or even the dramatic decrease in informa-
tion costs that it wrought.  Rather, it was with the shift from physical
interests to virtual ones.  This Article offered several responses.  First,
it advanced a more nuanced theory of personal jurisdiction prece-
dent, conceiving of it as a tripartite assemblage of constitutional re-
quirements, prudential limitations, and statutory commands.  Second,
311 See supra notes 151–53 and accompanying text. R
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it elucidated a concrete vision of the normative interests at stake in
personal jurisdiction debates, defining and focusing on fairness and
predictability.  Finally, it offered a coherent, minimalist answer to the
problem of intangible interests and harms, concluding that personal
jurisdiction values are usually best served by discounting Internet ac-
tivity when assessing a defendant’s connection to a particular forum.
While not everyone will welcome our proposal, we believe it usefully
advances the debate in civil procedure circles.
Perhaps more profoundly, we believe that the Article offers a con-
crete example of what cyberlaw offers legal scholarship more broadly.
At the founding moment of the cyberlaw field, skeptics (most notably
Judge Frank Easterbrook) criticized the project as folly—merely “law
of the horse,” contributing nothing to wider legal debates by focusing
on an irrelevant organizing principle.312  He challenged expositors of
the nascent subject to show how cyberlaw could illuminate more gen-
eral subjects.313  Larry Lessig, Jonathan Zittrain, Dan Hunter, and
others took up that challenge.314  We believe this Article demonstrates
anew why they were correct and Easterbrook was wrong.  By concen-
trating on the puzzle of personal jurisdiction and the Internet, this
Article has uncovered deeper unresolved questions in civil procedure,
from the difficulties of defining personal jurisdiction’s deepest values
to the challenge of identifying a limiting principle to the Supreme
Court’s expansive approach to reputational injuries.  Internet cases il-
luminated the larger problem of intangible interests and injuries in
personal jurisdiction.  The Internet is not exceptional for personal ju-
risdiction—it is a vital exemplar of deeper fissures in the doctrine that
courts and scholars should address holistically.  Moreover, it offers a
pathway to solutions not merely about the “Interwebs,” but about fun-
damental questions of state power, fairness, and efficiency.
312 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
207, 207–08 (1996).
313 See id. at 208.
314 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 501 (1999); Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, 44 B.C. L. REV. 653 (2003);
Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CALIF. L. REV.
439 (2003).
